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and it is now widely expected to continue expanding as a
procurement instrument in the future. In the PFI
framework, the public sector becomes the procurer and
regulator of services but not the provider. In the case of
private provision of infrastructure services, the public
sector only pays for the service received and only if the
service meets the predetermined output specification.
The background of PFI in the UK
The PFI strategy arose in the context of the economic
stagnation witnessed since the 1960s and the
expanding deficits that concerned the incoming
Thatcher government which came to power in 1979.
The Conservatives championed leaner and smaller
government and Thatcher stated that a primary aim of
her government was to roll back the frontiers of the state
and allow more direct private sector involvement in the
provision of public services. 
From 1979 onwards the UK Government introduced
privatisation and compulsory competitive tendering for
local authorities. The administration of John Major
continued the policies of downsizing the public sector
through deregulating and introducing market principles
into public services, reorganising government functions
into agencies, introducing the Citizen’s Charter and
promoting market testing in which the private sector
competes with public services. The underlying objective of
these policies was to shift the paradigm of government
from public administration to public management. PFI is
an extension of this policy and its real aim is
administrative reform and to transfer much of the public
sector’s role to the private sector.
The following timeline details the development of PFI
since 1977:
1977: Prior to 1977, all the capital expenditure of
nationalised industries and public corporations
was accounted and recorded within total public
expenditure and thus contributed towards the
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) – the
amount of money the government needs to
borrow to meet its spending plans, even when
wholly financed from internal resources derived
from user charges . The 1977 paper on the
redefinition of public expenditure and the 1978
White Paper on nationalised industries switched
the focus of government to the External Financing
Limit (EFL) – the cash limit of external financing.
Introduction
The private sector has always provided goods and services
to the public sector. Private infrastructure provision is not
a new idea. For instance, bridges have been privately
owned for centuries. 
However, a widespread feature of the last two decades
has been the shift away from the in-house provision of
services by the public sector towards the contracting out
of services to be provided by the private sector. These
services are both a contribution and an addition to the
provision of services by the government to the public, 
but the services are supplied by the private sector. 
Toll collectors, prison officers, teachers, hospital
administrators and cleaning staff are all examples of
private employees providing virtually identical provisions
to those provided traditionally via the public sector.
Growing anxiety over state budgetary deficits and
concerns over the inability of the public sector to manage
complex infrastructure efficiently in an increasingly
competitive environment, has led to the reversal of state
ownership as the norm for providing infrastructure to the
public at large. 
In the UK this process started in the 1980s. Between
1970-1996 large reductions in government investments
were observed in OECD countries. Privatisation and
public-sector expenditure constraints had given rise to a
substantial reduction in private and public sector
investment. So, in order to achieve infrastructure
development and to reduce the associated burden of
government debt the public authorities and national
governments sought to involve private capital to
implement design and build infrastructure projects and
to provide infrastructure services previously in the
domain of the public sector.
As part of this trend of using private capital for the
provision of public services in infrastructure projects, the
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched in 1992, as a
legal framework for concessions in the UK to encourage
private capital investment in the construction industry. In
the PFI framework the public sector defines the output
specification for the services to be purchased from the
private sector with a predefined payment mechanism.
The public purchases a service not an asset. 
After 1997 and the change of government from
Conservative to Labour, PFI gained momentum in the UK
PFI and its role in the delivery of public services
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1989: In a speech to the Institute of Directors in May
1989, John Major, the then Chief Secretary to the
Treasury, formally retired the Ryrie Rules on the
grounds that they had outlived their usefulness,
were seen as incomprehensible, and set
impossible hurdles . This move was intended to
further encourage ‘the private sector to bring
forward schemes for privately financed projects,
which offer value for money for the user and the
taxpayer’. The Ryrie Rules were abolished in 1989
and were followed in 1992 by the launch of PFI. 
The launch of PFI in the UK
1992: PFI was formally launched in the UK by Norman
Lamont, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, who
stated in his 1992 Budget Statement that: ‘…the
government has too often in the past treated
proposed projects as either wholly private or
wholly public. In future, the government will
actively encourage joint ventures with the private
sector, where these involve a sensible transfer of
risk to the private sector…Thirdly, we will allow
greater use of leasing where it offers good value
for money. As long as it can be shown that the risk
stays with the private sector, public organisations
will be able to enter into operating lease
agreements, with only the lease payments
counting as expenditure and without their capital
budgets being cut.’
The aim of introducing PFI was to achieve closer
partnering between the public and private sectors at both
central and local government levels. The intention was to
increase the flow of capital to projects against a
background of restraint on public expenditure by utilising
private sector money and management skills. It was also
intended to offer real benefits to the private sector in the
form of increased business profit. 
The guiding principles of PFI are similar to those
underlying the Ryrie Rules: ventures established under PFI
need to achieve a genuine transfer of risk to the private
sector and value for money in use of public resources. It is
intended to transform government departments from
being owners and operators of assets into the purchasers
of services from the private sector. In PFI procurement the
public sector specifies its services by way of an output
specification covering the objectives, purpose, scope and
performance requirements for the contract, with
emphasis being on the ‘what’ and not the ‘how’ in
relation to the service provision.
1979: The Conservative Party came to power in the UK
and a strict policy of reducing public expenditure
was put in place.
1981: During the recession of the early 1980s there was
much public debate as to whether restrictive EFLs
(designed to hold down the PSBR as a means of
controlling monetary supply growth) were
frustrating profitable nationalised industry
investment and thus needlessly exacerbating the
recession. In a review of the extensive debate on
EFL, The National Economic Development Council
(NEDC) formulated the Ryrie Rules. Under the
chairmanship of Sir William Ryrie, the then second
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, the rules
sought to establish criteria under which private
finance could be introduced into the nationalised
industries. The Ryrie Rules stated that:
• Decisions to provide funds for investment should
be taken under conditions of fair competition
with private sector borrowers; any links with the
rest of the public sector, government guarantees
or commitments, or monopoly power should not
result in the schemes offering investors a degree
of security significantly greater than available on
private sector projects
• Such projects should yield benefits in terms of
improved efficiency and profit from the
additional investment commensurate with the
cost of raising risk capital from financial markets
(HM Treasury, 1988).
The Ryrie Rules were revised in February to 
take into account the privatisation of previously
nationalised industries and the introduction of, 
for example, contracting out, mixed funding and
partnership schemes. 
The two fundamental principles of the 
guidelines were:
• Private finance could only be introduced 
where it offered cost-effectiveness (projects
must be tested against the equivalent
competitive price market)
• Privately financed projects for public sector
programmes had to be taken into account by the
government in its public expenditure planning
(HM Treasury, 1992).
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Construction PPP (PFI) can be categorised as follows:
• Service contracts – where the private sector alone
contributes to the service, without further government
capital input. The contract arrangements are: 
operation and maintenance; design and build; 
and turnkey contracts
• Service contract based on public facilities – this group is
characteristic of the private sector operating the
facilities. The procurement methods could be design-
build-finance-operate (DBFO); and lease-develop-
operate (LDO). This group also includes build-operate-
transfer (BOT) and build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT)
• Private sector permanent provision – these include
build-own-operate (BOO); buy-build-operate (BBO) or
privatisation
• Special vehicles/joint ventures (JV) – these are equity
JV, cooperatives and consortia. The private and public
sectors share the liability and return from the same 
JV company.
From the perspective of risk allocation, PFI projects are
classified into three types: 
• The financially free-standing type where risk is 
fully transferred to the private sector (for example, 
toll bridges)
• The joint venture type where risk is fully transferred
from the public sector with some public sector cash
contribution (for example, urban regeneration schemes)
• The type of services sold to the public sector where risk
is shared rather than fully transferred (for example,
DBFO road projects).
There are two fundamental characteristics of 
PFI projects:
• There must be a genuine risk transfer to the private
sector
• The project must provide value for money to 
the taxpayer.
The premise is that the transfer of risk to the private sector,
coupled with the efficiencies in management skills will
outweigh the higher costs of private funding, resulting in
greater value for money to the taxpayers.
The 1992 Budget Statement contained ‘important
changes’ to the rules governing the use of private finance
by public sector organisations. In short, the issues
identified as fundamental to policy evaluation were:
modifications to the value for money criterion;
‘additionality’; measurement of efficiency gains and
additional financing costs; and determining whether risk
has been transferred. 
HM Treasury noted in 1993 that, ‘PFI, unlike the earlier
policies of privatisation and contracting out, is based on
an enterprise and discipline [that] can bring gains in
efficiency and reduction in costs and is stimulated by the
government keeping inflation down and getting public
finances back on the right track.’ Within this statement
the Treasury claimed the following main issues:
• PFI can bring gains in efficiency
• PFI can bring inflation down
• PFI can limit public sector spending
• The public sector’s need for capital expenditure (private
financing of capital projects).
PFI is not about borrowing money from the private 
sector. It is supposed to be about creating a structure in
which improved value for money is achieved through
private sector innovation and management skills
delivering significant performance improvements and
efficiency savings.
Under PFI, governments no longer build roads but
purchase miles of maintained highway; governments no
longer build prisons but buy custodial services. What
makes PFI different is that the public sector retains a
substantial role in PFI projects and the private sector
provides capital assets as well as the services. Increasing
levels of partnering with the private sector have evolved
and, by this partnering agenda, the public sector receives
the benefit to increase its efficiency through the
introduction of managerial change and expertise drawn
from the private sector.
There is always confusion between PFI and PPP. 
PFI is a public service delivery type of PPP where
responsibility for providing public services like
transportation, sanitation, etc is transferred from the
public to the private sector for a considerable period of
time. PFI is therefore a generic classifier for all types of
‘construction’ PPP. The whole concept of PFI is a
government policy to tackle financial problems in facility
provision and integrate private management skills to
increase efficiency, effectiveness and quality. The level of
private sector involvement might range from a service
provision, without recourse to public facilities usage, up
to public facilities ownership.
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The Treasury Taskforce was established in September
1997 as the focal point for PFI activity across government.
It concentrated on a number of significant projects,
helping departments to set priorities while trying to ease
negotiations and gain value for money. The Taskforce
published a series of guidance documents, policy
statements, technical notes and case studies.
1999: The second review of PFI by Sir Malcolm Bates was
published in July. Its recommendations concentrated
on institutional change and government plans for
taking the recommendations forward. It also
pointed to the following areas of weakness:
• Strategic planning
• Project management
• Negotiation skills
• Financial disciplines
• Management of long-term contracts.
Bates also identified three alternative institutional
arrangements following the expiry of the taskforce:
• Extend the life of the taskforce
• Create a public sector, fee-earning agency; or
• Set up a new Public Private Partnership.
Bates recommended that a permanent
organisation, Partnerships UK, be formed 
to replace the Taskforce.
Peter Gershon was invited to review ‘civil
procurement in central government’ in the light
of the government’s objectives on efficiency,
modernisation and competitiveness in the short
and medium term. Gershon examined the whole
process of acquisition from third parties by
government. The acquisition process spans the
whole life-cycle from initial inception through to
the end of the useful life of the asset or the
completion of the contract. In his July review,
Gershon identified a number of weaknesses in
government procurement which cover:
• Organisation
• Process
• People and skills
• Measurement
• Contribution of the centre of government.
The evolution of PFI in the UK
Changes introduced 1992-97
1993: The private sector showed little interest in the
1992 Budget Statement. The subsequent
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kenneth Clarke, in his
1993 Budget Statement gave PFI a greater impetus
by announcing that a new Private Finance Panel
would be created and its role would be:
• To encourage greater participation in the
initiative by both the public and private sectors
• To stimulate new ideas
• To identify new areas of public sector activity
where the private sector could become involved
• To seek solutions to any problems that might
impede progress.
1994: Kenneth Clarke ensured engagement with the
private sector by making plain that the Treasury
would not approve any capital project unless
options to secure private finance had been
explored. It became mandatory that all capital
projects in the public sector that required Treasury
approval would explore private-finance options.
1996: The 4Ps (Public Private Partnerships Programme)
was established in April by the Local Authority
Association of England and Wales to promote PFI
in the local authority sector with the express aim
of bringing about increased investment in local
services through PFI and other public/private
sector partnerships.
Changes introduced from 1997 onwards
1997: PFI was the Conservative Party’s approach to
financing and managing an upgrade of Britain’s
‘social infrastructure’. With the election of Labour
in 1997, the new government continued to back
the concept under the PPP banner.
In May Geoffrey Robinson, then Paymaster
General, announced that Sir Malcolm Bates was to
conduct a speedy review of the PFI process. He also
announced an end to universal testing – the rule
that capital projects had to be tested for private
finance potential. The first Bates Review reported
on 26 June 1997, outlining 27 recommendations
to streamline and improve delivery of PFI projects.
One consequence was the creation of a PFI
Taskforce inside the Treasury to help foster PFI
expertise within government.
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The strategic objective of Partnerships UK was to create a
catalyst to achieve quicker and better value for money PFI
and PPP deals which, by mobilising private sector skills in
service of the public interest and easing the financial
constraints on public sector procurers, would enhance the
flow of investment into the nation’s infrastructure.
Partnerships UK was supposed to work in close
conjunction with the OGC, while the Taskforce would
continue as a part of the OGC. 
2001: In March, Partnerships UK became a Public Private
Partnership in its own right following the sale to
private investors of a 51% stake, with 49% being
retained in public hands.
2002: In July, the second edition of Standardisation of PFI
Contracts was produced as OGC Guidance. The
revised second edition sought to clarify, enhance
and re-balance the guidance in the light of the
public and private sectors’ experience of the
guidance over the past three years. The most
critical changes were: refinancing, compensation
on termination, and insurance issues.
2003: Until April 2003, the Private Finance Unit (PFU)
within the OGC had responsibility for developing
and promoting PFI policy for public bodies. In
March 2003 Justin Slater, Head of Private Finance
Policy and Practice at the OGC, announces that an
‘expanded HM Treasury PFU under the leadership
of Geoffrey Spence will now carry out all those
responsibilities presently carried out by the OGC
PFU.’ The responsibilities transferred included:
• Ministerial and parliamentary business on
generic PFI policy matters
• Ownership of standardisation of PFI contracts-
written guidance for authorities on how to agree
PFI contacts
• PFI statistics disclosed to Parliament
• Ownership of the Project Review Group
Secretariat – the process by which projects 
are reviewed when there is a full business case 
to consider
• Single point responsibility for managing the
government’s framework agreement with
Partnerships UK.
In line with policy changes, Gus O’Donnell
replaced Peter Gershon as the officer in charge 
of PFI policy.
Gershon’s proposals for dealing with these weaknesses
led to the creation of a central organisation called Office
of Government Commerce (OGC). The first edition of
Standardisation of PFI Contracts was produced in July 1999
(SoPC, 1999). Its aims were to:
• Provide guidance on the key issues that arise in
PFI projects in order to promote the achievement
of commercially balanced contracts
• Enable public sector procurers to meet their
requirements and deliver best value for money.
The three main objectives of the first edition
were to:
• Promote a common understanding of the main risks
encountered in a standard PFI project
• Allow a consistency of approach in pricing across
a range of similar projects
• Reduce the time and costs of negotiation 
by enabling all parties concerned to agree a
range of areas that can follow a standard
approach without expanded negotiations. 
2000: Gershon’s (and therefore the OGC’s) aim was 
to modernise procurement throughout
government, provide a greater sense of direction in
procurement and promote best practice in the
public sector. In his proposal, government
departments would need to work more closely
with the OGC and in some cases accept some loss
of sovereignty in procurement matters, on the
understanding that this would deliver better value
for money for government.
Partnerships UK, launched in June, replaced the
projects arm of the Treasury Taskforce to work
with both public and private bodies on specific 
PPP transactions to improve the process planning,
negotiation and completion of PPPs. With a board
comprising members of both the private and
public sectors, the aim of Partnerships UK was: 
‘to deliver better value for money by working on
the side of the public sector’. For a particular
project, it would align itself with the public sector
procuring authority and inject more detailed
examination of practical considerations into the
decision-making process and drive forward the
conclusion of deals. By doing this it was supposed
to help departments and other public sector
organisations make a better job of procuring 
PFI deals.
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2004: In April, the third edition of Standardisation of 
PFI Contracts was produced by HM Treasury. 
The following assumptions are implicit within 
the guidance:
• The party contracting with the public sector is a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with 
sub-contractors providing the actual
performance on its behalf
• The project involves some development or 
a construction phase, followed by an operational
phase during which the full service is provided
• The project is wholly or partly financed by
limited recourse debt.
In July, a Local Government Supplement to
Standardisation of PFI Contracts is produced by
4Ps as guidance to provide assistance to local
authorities.
‘The aim of introducing PFI was to
achieve closer partnering between the
public and private sectors at both
central and local government levels’.
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The current state of PFI in the UK
PFI has been widely developed in the UK. New facilities 
in schools, prisons and roads have delivered substantial
benefits, but UK policy makers are continuing to learn
lessons on how PFI can be delivered more effectively.
PFI capital expenditures are an addition to traditional
government capital expenditure. According to the UK’s
2005 Budget, gross public sector capital expenditure is
projected to rise from £38.8 billion in 2004-05 to £47
billion in 2005-06. As a proportion of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) public capital expenditure will rise from
3.3% of GDP to 3.8% over this period. Table 2.1 shows 
the projected levels of capital expenditure under PFI, 
as released by HM Treasury. Departmental estimates of
capital spending by the private sector (signed deals) for
the financial years 2005-06 to 2007-08 are shown in 
Table 2.2.
The current state of PFI in the UK and its place
in the global market
chapter two
Table 2.1: Public sector gross investment
Outturn Estimate Projections
% % %
£ Billion 2003/04 2004/5 2005/6 
Total public sector 
gross investment 29 33 41.7
(as % of GDP) 3.20% 3.30% 3.80%
Estimated gross investment
under PFI (signed deals) 14.8 2.8 3.2
(as a % of total 
public capital expenditure) 33.79% 7.82% 7.13%
Total publicly sponsored 
capital expenditure 43.8 35.8 44.9
(as % of GDP) 4.83% 3.58% 4.09%
Source: Budget 2003, Budget 2004, Budget 2005, 
Treasury PFI statistics
Table 2.2: Departmental estimate of private sector capital spending (signed deals)
Projections (£ million)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Education and Skills - - -
Health 848 560 334
Transport 1 494 1 343 1 202
ODPM 71 53 14
Home Office 45 0 0
Lord Chancellor’s Department 27 18 0
Defence 458 304 181
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 5 5 0
Trade and Industry 8 1 0
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 47 28 27
Work and Pensions - - -
Scotland 109 32 -
Wales 23 0 0
Northern Ireland Executive 40 24 0
Chancellor’s departments 41 36 37
Cabinet Office - - -
Culture, Media and Sport 13 9 0
Total 3 229 2 413 1 795
Source: Budget 2005, HM Treasury
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Between 1986 and 2004, 667 projects were signed under
PFI with a capital value of over £42 billion. While there
were a few projects in the early 1990s, including a large
contract of £4 billion for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link in
1996, most have been signed since 1997 (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Signed PFI projects 1987-2004
Breakdown by year
Year Number of signed projects Capital value (£m)
1987 1 180.0
1988 0 0.0
1989 0 0.0
1990 2 336.0
1991 2 6.0
1992 5 518.5
1993 1 1.6
1994 2 10.5
1995 11 667.5
1996 38 1560.1
1997 60 2474.9
1998 86 2758.0
1999 99 2580.4
2000 108 3934.2
2001 85 2210.8
2002 70 7732.5
2003 52 14854.1
2004 45 2809.8
Total 667 42634.9
Source: HM Treasury
Table 2.4: PFI in government departments 
(cumulative total, 1990-2003)
Number £ m % share
Transport 44 37 972 66.9
Defence 59 4 011 7.1
Health 152 3 596 6.3
Scottish Executive 29 2 217 3.9
Education 102 2 028 3.6
Home Office 52 1 976 3.5
Work and Pensions 7 961 1.7
Welsh Assembly 17 508 0.9
Northern Ireland Executive 29 395 0.7
Environment 14 1 000 1.8
Others 112 2 060 3.6
Total 617 56 724 100.0
Source: IFSL, 2003
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Overall, PFI has accounted for between 12-15% of annual
public sector capital investment since 1996, with the
remainder being carried out through conventional forms
of procurement. The annual number of contracts has
fallen from a peak of 108 in 2000 to 45 in 2004 but this
has been accompanied by an increase in the average size
of the contract, as procurement costs on smaller deals
have come under greater scrutiny. PFI in government
departments is shown in table 2.4 and the largest PFI
contracts as a cumulative total between 1990-2003 are
shown in table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Largest PFI contracts of signed deals in the UK (£ million)
Capital value Government
department
London Underground (LU) PPP 28,381 Transport
Channel Tunnel rail link 4,178 Transport
National Air Traffic Services (NATS) 800 Transport
Skynett 5 military satellite communications 750 Defence
National police digital radio service 500 Home Office
M6 Toll Road 485 Transport
LU Ltd Northern Line trains 409 Transport
East Sussex & Brighton Waste Management 400 Environment
LU Ltd communications 355 Transport
Second Severn River crossing 331 Transport
Royal Navy Fleet Communications Service 280 Defence
University College London – New hospital 267 Health
Armed Forces Personnel Administration Agency 264 Defence
Section of A1(M) road 245 Transport
Glasgow Schools Project 225 Education
Nottingham light rail 220 Transport
Employment Service IT Partnership 217 Work & Pensions
Defence main building refurbishment 209 Defence
London Regional Transport Croydon Tramlink 205 Transport
Source: IFSL, 2003
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PFI will no longer be used for IT projects or for projects
costing less than £20 million because of the high
transaction costs. There is also to be increased investment
in secondary schools through programmes such as the
‘Building Schools for the Future’ programme. New areas
for the PFI will include social housing, urban regeneration,
and waste recycling. 
PFI construction performance in the UK
Evidence from two studies in the UK about PFI
performance is shown in table 2.6.
The future prospects of PFI in the UK
In ‘PFI: Meeting the Investment Challenge’, published by
the Treasury on 15 July 2003, the progress of PFI in the UK
is reviewed and concludes that the future of PFI in the UK
seems certain. On a capital value basis, the UK Treasury
expects the biggest increases to come in the health and
defence sectors. The Department of Health projects 55
deals by the end of 2005 with an estimated capital value
of £6.5 billion while the Ministry of Defence is expected
to sign 14 deals with a similar capital value.
Table 2.6: PFI construction performance in the UK
PFI construction performance in the UK
Performance features National Audit Office (2001) HM Treasury (2003)
1. Delivering on time 76% (PFI) 88%
30% (Non-PFI)
2. Delivering to budget 79% (PFI) 79%
27% (Non-PFI)
3. Quality of design The consortia in PFI projects: 
Invested in good design and 
construction at the start of 
the contract; achieved better quality
buildings and reduction in maintenance
costs while maintaining the assets to
the standards agreed in the contract;
placed more emphasis on aesthetics 
of design than before.
Source: NAO, 2001 and HM Treasury, 2003
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PFI operational performance in the UK
Evidence from the same studies in the UK about the 
PFI operational performance is shown in table 2.7. Full
assessment of the operational performance of PFI will
only be possible at a much later stage in the contracts. 
A National Audit Office study of 98 projects and HM
Treasury study of 61 projects has provided initial
indications of overall project performance through
seeking the view of public sector PFI managers on
achievement of expectations and VFM.
Table 2.7: PFI operational performance in the UK
Performance features National Audit Office (2001) HM Treasury (2003)
1. Achievement of expectations N/A 25% ‘far surpassing’
35% ‘as expected’
16% ‘surpassing’
2. Value for Money 6% ‘excellent’
46% ‘good’
29% ‘satisfactory’ N/A
15% ‘marginal’
4% ‘poor’
3. Overall performance of the private sector matching N/A 25% ‘far surpassing’
up to expectation at the time of contract close ’51% ‘as expected’ or ‘better’
18% ‘less than expected’
6% ‘much less than expected’
Source: NAO, 2001 and HM Treasury, 2003
PFI’s place in Europe and in the global market
PFI in Europe
The United Nations has become an increasingly
prominent advocate of PPP/PFI in Europe. The United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe agreed to
establish the Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) Expert Group
in January 1996, to provide information to its member
states on new project finance techniques for countries in
central and eastern Europe. Despite the enormous
international interest at regional, national and
international levels there has been disappointment at the
lack of successful PPP/PFI. One of the key barriers has
been the lack of government skills in identifying and
bringing forward projects into the market.
Across Europe and elsewhere, governments and local
authorities are investigating how the concept of PPP/PFI
might work in their markets. One of the most efficient
models seems to be to appoint one centralised
government office to facilitate privately financed
infrastructure projects. Many countries have established
PPP/PFI units. It is a positive time for PPP/PFI, with project
potential increasingly recognised. Each market in Europe
is at a different stage in the development of PPP/PFI. The
European market as a whole appears to be changing and
evolving. Table 2.8 shows a selection of different European
countries (except UK) and the current situation of PPP/PFI
projects respectively.
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Table 2.8: Current situation of PPP/PFI in different European countries
Country Explanation of government PPP/PFI policy and projects
Croatia No single government authority.
Government strategy is positively oriented to use BOT schemes for motorway construction.
Transport, energy and water sectors have priority.
A new law is being prepared to facilitate concessions.
Czech Republic In 2000 a task force was established to study PPP/PFI proposals.
The task force will act as the nucleus of the joint venture of the public institutions and the private sector.
France No formal governmental PPP/PFI unit.
There is a long-established tradition of public-private co-operation using a concession structure.
The French PPP model goes back more than a hundred years in the form of Societés d’Economic Mixtes
and Concessions.
PPP/PFI is not an instrument permitted in the social infrastructure area.
Germany No formal central government unit or programme.
A BOT law exists.
Principally developing PPP/PFI in the transport (tunnels), defence and education sectors.
Greece Government has formally launched a PPP/PFI programme in November 2000.
There is a central PPP/PFI unit.
Road concessions (real toll), 2004 Olympic Games infrastructure, light rail projects.
Hungary No governmental authority specially assigned to deal with PPP/PFI.
Seriously considering the PPP/PFI model for water, waste disposal and transport sector.
The government has serious intentions to expand public-private partnerships (Széchenyi Plan).
Ireland The government has a strong public commitment to a formal PPP/PFI programme.
The Irish administrative structure is based on the interaction of four different elements: 
(1) Central PPP/PFI Unit in the Department of Finance, 
(2) the Interdepartmental Working Group on PPPs/PFI (IDG), 
(3) the Public/Private Informal Advisory Group on PPPs/PFI (IAG),
(4) the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Infrastructure.
Many projects covering road, rail, education, water and waste sectors.
Italy There is a special PPP/PFI Taskforce – Unità tecnica Finanza di Progetto (UFP).
Legislative reform of the Public Works Framework Law (Merloni Law) in 1998 set the framework 
for using private sector contractors and incorporated provisions on project finance.
Hospital, transport and waste management projects are in progress.
The government expected to finance through private funds €9 billion of new infrastructure 
between 2001-2004.
Netherlands A strong framework is in place for PPP/PFI including a dedicated PPP/PFI Unit.
Kennis-centrum PPPs was set up in 1999 within the Ministry of Finance.
The current list of projects includes road, railway, harbours, water, health, education 
and government buildings projects.
Poland PPP/PFI is a new concept in Poland.
Some pilot projects have been identified.
The Polish law provides for direct financing by government (up to 15%) 
of the total costs of the development of motorways.
The same law allows government to share the risk of investment up to 50%.
Portugal Portugal was an early exponent of PPP/PFI in Europe.
Many large road PPP/PFI projects have been pushed ahead successfully in Portugal, for example
the Tagus Bridge in Lisbon.
There is no central PPP/PFI government unit.
Ministry of Public Works has developed the SCUT programme to build the country’s road infrastructure.
The government is promoting large and medium sized PPP/PFI projects.
Spain No established formal PPP/PFI Unit.
Government has a road programme using the shadow toll structure.
PPP/PFI projects are planned for roads, rail lines, health and waste management sector.
Source: United Nations, 2002; IFSL, 2003 and PwC, 2001
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Table 2.9: Current situation of PPP/PFI in some countries outside Europe
Country Current PPP/PFI situation
Australia The first DBFO privatisations occurred in the 1990s.
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland have now developed PPP/PFI policies 
and plans for future investment.
Partnerships Victoria (PV), established in 2000 is more of a policy and guidance approach as opposed to
an agency. PV provides guidance and assistance for partnership projects, but does not manage processes
related to specific projects or provide approvals
There is a certain amount of debate surrounding the VFM afforded by PPP/PFI.
Brazil The Brazilian federal government has formed a strategic PPP commission which 
has identified several pilot projects.
The government required approximately $200 billion for infrastructure investment and PPP 
has been identified as a potential solution. 
Canada The Government of British Columbia established Partnerships British Columbia in 2002. Partnerships
British Columbia provides advice, support and assistance to public sector client agencies on non-
traditional funding relating to capital assets.
Partnerships British Columbia maintains an independent profile within government and with the 
private sector. It is not an approval organisation but a facilitator of successful project implementation.
Partnerships British Columbia expects seven financial closes by April 2005 representing approximately 
$3.5 billion worth of capital assets including hospitals, water treatment plant, bridges, roads and rail
rapid transit line.
Other provinces, such as Ontario and Quebec, are also looking at PPP. 
Japan A private finance law was enacted in 2000 (PFI Law) and the first PFI commenced later that year. PFI 
has progressed more slowly than expected. Seven deals have reached financial close. Various pathfinder
projects are considered in offices, accommodation, waste, energy, transport and healthcare.
In Japan there is no central government agency coordinating PFI policy or projects.
Within government a PFI Cabinet Office for the Government of Japan has been established. Within the
Cabinet Office the PFI Promotion Committee is beginning to develop guidelines and systems for the
country.
Mexico PPP is used as a solution to the $20 billion project schedule. Individual states are being encouraged to
come up with pilot projects.
South Africa Has looked closely at PPP for some time and set up a Governmental PPP Task Force in 1997 and a PPP
Unit in 2000. South Africa manages public private partnerships through the National Treasury ministry.
The Public Finance Management Act passed in 2000 governs the implementation of PPPs. In South Africa
the PPP agency is mandatory and it is both a facilitator and an approval mechanism.
The PPP Unit has published a list of potential PPP projects but few deals have been completed to date.
Source: Partnerships British Columbia, 2004; IFSL, 2003; PwC, 2001
The situation of PPP/PFI in other countries outside Europe
is summarised in table 2.9 below. It is also worth noting
that there are three significant omissions, namely the
United States of America, China and Russia. The US
Government does not have a recent track record of Public
Private Partnership (although the early railways were
developed as part of an early form of PFI). There appears
to be a desire to explore PFI in Russia but the current
political climate is not conducive. China has been involved
in some PFI but there is no formal source to obtain
accurate data.
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Introduction
This chapter outlines eight PFI case studies in the UK and Portugal.
The A55 Road
Case studies
Chapter three
Location: North Wales, United Kingdom
Project cost: £101 million
Sector: Transport – Major road development – Llandegai
to Holyhead - refurbishment and upgrading of existing
and new build of interconnecting sections.
Status: Operational. Finance agreement closed in 16
December 1998. Construction completed 31 March 2001.
Contract Permit to Use 24 March 2001.
Sponsors: Concessionaire/Lead Manager – UK Highways
Plc/Carillion-Laing JV.
Purchaser: Authority: National Assembly for Wales;
Highways Directorate
Contract package: Bespoke ‘PFI’ style agreement
Concession: Total 30 year concession
Background – history and objectives
The project had been a regional imperative for a number
of years. The original A5 had been a notorious bottleneck
for at least 25 years. The main objective was to improve
the travel times. On 10 July 1996 the Welsh Office
Transport Minister, Guinlyn Jones, announced that the
new A55 dual carriageway across Anglesey, was to be
built. The existing A55 across North Wales is part of the
Trans-European Road Network, which has been upgraded
to dual carriageway from the M56 motorway to the
Llanfair PG bypass on Anglesey. The A55 DBFO Project
extends the existing dual carriageway to Holyhead. 
In December 1998 UK Highways was awarded the
concession to design, build, finance and operate the A55
from Llandegai to Holyhead. UK Highways is a company
consisting of Hyder, Carillion and Laing, who awarded the
design and construct contract to a fully integrated joint
venture between Carillion and Laing.
Bidding process – chronology of key events
A fairly protracted bidding process occurred between July
1996 and 16 December 1998.
Construction phase
The road comprises dual 7.3m wide carriageways with 
1m hard strips and a design speed of 120km/hr. The route
generally runs off line and parallel to the existing A5 through
a rural environment. The last 1.2km is through the urban
area of Holyhead where the design speed is 85km/hr. 
Table 3.1: Construction work summary
Ecological work; archaeological work.
Site clearance; earthworks (3.5million m3); drainage (100 000
million).
Road construction: length approximately 25 miles; 300 000
tonnes of Bitmac; 47 000 m3 concrete; 11 000 tonnes of
reinforcement; 1.5million tonnes of road aggregate.
Structures: 23 bridges, 10 underpasses, 9 major culverts,
7 major retaining walls.
Traffic signs, road markings, signals and lighting. 
Time and cost – completed two years ahead of plan.
Cheaper than traditional procurement, however fees 
are payable for 25 years. All maintenance at risk to
concessionaire.
Quality – better than traditional - because concessionaire
must maintain for 25 years.
Case study 1
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Operational phase
Introduced two years earlier than anticipated. Working 
to an agreed shadow toll payment mechanism.
Risk transfer
As a very early project the risk transfer was predominantly
to the concessionaire who passed the same risks on to
the road constructor or the road operator company. 
Value for money
The taxpayer, client and concessionaire all achieved VFM
as a road has been constructed two years ahead of
schedule. The almost total transfer of risk on to the
private sector prevents escalation of costs and time and
provides government with a more defined cash flow cycle.
The private sector concessionaire is in a position to
transfer a significant proportion of associated
construction risks to the contractor and the operational
risks to the operational contractor which prevents any
significant changes to their financial cost model. 
Implications for the JV consortium: The contract did not
permit increased payments by the authority to reflect
increases in the contractor’s costs, but only in certain
circumstances, such as department changes. The
consortium had the flexibility to change the design and
incorporate innovative ideas and used value engineering
wherever possible, in order to minimise costs and hence
provide VFM. The consortium’s financial gains were reliant
on shadow tolls in conjunction with minimum
maintenance costs, making it necessary for the road to be
completed on time and to a high standard. 
Implications for the construction contractor: One problem
with regards to VFM for the contractors was the
protracted nature of the bidding process and its expense
(estimated to be five times more expensive than
traditional bids of a comparable cost). This puts primacy
on how many construction firms can afford to risk this
sum of money on potential non-starters. It has been
suggested that there should be limitations to competition
to three or four parties to reduce the number of failures.
Table 3.2: Quality implications for the contractual parties
Client Concessionaire Contractor
The DBFO Co. is responsible for a 
30-year concession period. The level 
of commitment of the DBFO Co. is far
greater than what it is traditionally. 
In PFI/DBFO it is necessary to get the
quality right. The consequence of lane
closures could result in a tremendous loss
of revenue to the DBFO Co.
The quality has to be there from day one,
or potentially future problems could occur.
DBFO projects provide quality from the
short to medium term. 
Under traditional procurement the client
can specify what they want, the same
procedure can occur within PFI projects.
‘No defects’, does not necessarily equate to
better quality.
It is difficult to determine whether PFI
produces better quality. 
PFI produces a similar quality to traditional
methods; it is very dependent on the
quality of the people.
The 30-year concession period may be too
short to ensure the achievement of long
term quality. 
Long term involvement does not ensure
good quality within a project.
PositiveKey Neutral Negative
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Key messages
The main obstacles
Time constraints: Unable to look at alternative methods
of achieving these solutions. Lack of time to plan the
project properly. Concession periods may be too short
and therefore constrain the achievement of better quality
in projects.
Risk: Better planning and a better understanding of 
what needs to be done. The earlier the team is brought
together the better the understanding will be of the
quality required. Risk is transferred onto the contractor
and the contractor will not invest long term quality into
the scheme.
Documentation: A lack of understanding about the
complexity of the documentation and the contract
conditions.
People: Quality is often dependent on the quality of
people. It costs no more for operatives to carry out a 
good job as opposed to a poor job.
Knowledge: Lack of background and history of the
project. Not being able to understand problems that the
client may experience when taking the project through
public scrutiny.
Money: Constraints minimise the quality. The more
money, the better the quality the project will be.
Table 3.3: Summary of perceived quality objectives
Client Concessionaire Contractor
The A55 is far superior in terms of quality,
reduced wastage, less remedial work
required than normal. The site has been
tidier throughout the project.
The DBFO Co. (UK Highways) is responsible
for the project for 30 years. Quality is
required from the start to ensure
minimum maintenance. 
The nature of the risk transfer has enabled
the JV to provide a better quality project.
The nature of the contract ensures that
quality is there from day one.
The A55 provides an overall better quality
service.
Quality has to be right, otherwise lane
closures (for remedial work) would result
in loss of revenue.
In terms of construction, UK Highways
was unsure as to whether PFI achieves
better quality in comparison to traditional
routes.
The project was completed with zero
defects, but these may be measured
against a product of a lesser quality.
PositiveKey Neutral Negative
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Conclusions
The project became operational two years before the
anticipated operational date utilising traditional
procurement techniques. Transfer times have improved
and the travel volumes have also increased beyond the
maximum forecast. A few quotes taken directly from the
case study participants illustrate the benefits of the PFI
approach for this project:
• ‘The level of commitment is far greater than
traditionally…this ensures that the quality is there from
day one otherwise it could cause future problems.’
• ‘The A55 is far superior in terms of quality, reduced
wastage, less remedial work required than what there
would be traditionally.’
• ‘The project has been completed with zero defects.’
• ‘The A55 overall provides a better service.’
These statements highlight the widely accepted view that
this PFI contract has provided VFM. However, it has been
acknowledged that it is difficult to determine whether PFI
provides better quality in comparison to traditional
routes, as traditional routes generally have lower
specifications and are simpler to construct. Due to the
encouragement of lifecycle costing, it is likely that good
quality materials will be used to provide quality long term
– with life-cycle costing, better quality materials may be
used to cut down on maintenance costs.
Further investigation: is required of the accuracy of the
operation and maintenance forecasts and the whole-life
cycle costs should be re-examined in view of the
increased traffic flows to inform future predictions for
road construction projects. 
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Victoria Dock Primary School
Case study 2
Location: Kingston-Upon-Hull, East Yorkshire, United Kingdom
Project cost: Total cost £1 million
Sector: Education
Status: Operational since January 1999
Sponsors: The Victoria Dock School PFI Limited owned 
by Sewell Construction
Purchaser: Kingston Upon Hull City Council 
Education Authority
Contractual package and concession period: The City Council
contributed £200 000 covered by central government
grants. The private partner applied £250 000 of their own
funds and recurred to a traditional corporate finance bank
loan over 10 years for financial leverage for the remainder
of the financing. The land where the school was built has
been leased to the Sewell group for 40 years, although
the PFI contract is for 25 years only. For the 15 years
following this period, the buildings and land can have
alternative uses ranging from a school, disco, nursery,
homecare, etc, each according to the needs of the local
residents. The reason for opening up the possibility of an
alternative use for the buildings is that in 25 years the
demographics in the area may have changed and there
may therefore no longer be a need for the school.
Alternative uses could therefore be more beneficial in the
longer term. The complete concession is due to end in 2039.
Special features: This was the first primary school in the
UK to be built under a PFI scheme. The project was
negotiated in 1998 between Hull City Council and Sewell
Group and its success meant that an extension of
facilities soon had to be contemplated. The new building
was completed in January 2001.
Background – history and objectives
The Victoria Dock Primary School is located in 
Kingston-upon-Hull and serves the new estate
development of Victoria Dock. It is part of a revitalisation
programme of neglected areas such as the docks. It
was built due to public pressure because of a lack of
educational facilities in the area. A PFI scheme was used
because Hull City Council didn’t have sufficient funds to
build a new school. 
Bidding process - chronology of key events 
The life cycle of this PFI project started with the Kingston
Upon Hull City Council Education Authority establishing a
‘Service Need’ for the provision of local educational
services. As the Council had insufficient funding to
undertake construction it considered the then innovative
PFI route in the education sector. The standard procedures
in a PFI required the development of a business case and
the Public Sector Comparator. This was followed by the
Intention To Negotiate (ITN) and the nomination of Sewell
Construction as the preferred bidder. It then took 12-15
months for the signing of the PFI contract and to achieve
financial close to provide 25 years of educational services.
Within this contract there is a further extension of 15
years for possible alternative use of the land and building. 
The major delay was caused by the need to sort out
the legal details – this took six months while in normal
circumstances the average period would last around two
months. The lengthy negotiations were worsened by an
incomplete design. Only after being selected as the
preferred bidder was the design refined and detailed by
Sewell. The school was scheduled to start operating in
January 1999, which made it necessary to reduce the
construction stage from nine to six months. This was
achieved successfully. A further extension of the school
premises was completed in September 2001. 
Construction phase
The construction was undertaken by Sewell Construction.
The Sewell Group had past experience in school
construction and property development. The group had a
great deal of involvement and expertise in building
maintenance, refurbishment of schools and hospitals, etc.
and this gave the group a sense of a long-term approach
to business. As regards the construction and design 
sub-contract, no commercial details have been released.
‘This was the first primary school in the
UK to be built under a PFI scheme’.
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Operational phase
The facilities management is provided by Sewell Facility
Management. Payment is against square footage of class
space availability and performance. In the case of a
teacher’s absence, due for example to illness or other
external cause that affects availability or performance,
they lose their revenue. This loss is covered by insurance
and the premium is built into the financial model. After
40 years the buildings and the land are to revert to the
council. A possible extension of the contract is on an open
book basis, ie, the concessionaire states all the costs
which are verified by an auditor from the Authority. 
The school began with 60 pupils in 1999, rising to 94 by
2000 (26 in kinder-garden) with ages ranging from three
to eleven and distributed in three classes: three to five, six
to seven and eight to 11. The school has been operating
successfully and has earned a good reputation with
growing demand from outside the estate development.
The construction of a further building was completed in
January 2001 and raised the total capacity of the school
to 220 pupils. Sewell Facility Management undertakes the
day to day maintenance and repair maintenance. Sewell
Construction built the kitchens but doesn’t provide
catering. The catering is contracted-out to the local
authority, which already had this capacity and was keen
to use it. Meals are prepared offsite and heated in the school.
Risk transfer
The essence of this PFI contract lies in the transfer of risk
to the private sector. The underlying concept is that the
risk is allocated to the party best able to manage it, and
this results in cost reductions brought about through
increases in efficiency and innovations introduced by the
private sector. The Victoria Dock Primary School PFI Ltd
takes all the risks inherent to the concession, such as the
social, legal and regulatory, economic and financial,
environmental, political, and technical (bidding,
construction and design) risks. 
In these risk categories the main issues were related to
bidding costs as the legal costs were ten times the
original estimate (ie £50 000 instead of £5 000). The
construction and design risks were minimised by
adopting conservative design and construction
techniques with which Sewell had ample experience. The
constructor even supplied all the materials, taking special
care to use only those whose reliability was well proven.
As the contract is for availability of space there is no risk
derived from any demographic changes in the area. 
The school has an insurance policy (hotel type) that covers
the whole range of services. The school was designed to
have low maintenance costs, paying special attention on
the need to reduce potential vandalism. For instance, use
is made of external steel shutters (very uncommon in the
UK) which, although more expensive (due to higher initial
investment and maintenance every six months) prove in
the long run to be a good investment by reducing (or
stopping) the breakage of glass windows. 
As the school pays for its own gas and electricity, great
effort was made to design an energy efficient building
(also not currently common in the UK). Some special
features to reduce whole life cycle costs include: double
glazed windows, large cavity walls with air pockets to
improve insulation, less expensive roof tiles that are
replaced every 15 years instead of 25 years for the
traditional aluminium foil decking. In addition the
concrete floor was not insulated as it was judged that
little heat would escape this way. Doors are painted
instead of varnished and are therefore easier to repair. To
reduce vandalism and for added security, thick plywood
decking has been installed beneath the roofing tiles as a
way of preventing break-ins. 
So far the only vandalism has been graffiti. The security
system is sub-contracted to Prosegur. To reduce costs and
increase efficiency in maintenance the school has a multi-
skilled and flexible ‘caretaker’ to resolve simple tasks, such
as fixing a plug. Training is also provided. For more
complex maintenance problems, such as the breakdown
of heating systems, an external contractor is used. 
Throughout the process a partnering approach was used,
promoting co-operation between all the parties involved.
The decision taken by Sewell to promote a ‘community
dividend’ only enhanced this approach. The Victoria Dock
School PFI Ltd returns a proportion of its profit to the
community and, as of 2000, this represented around £35
000 being returned to the school to be applied on special
projects. For example, a wildlife wood was set up within
the school grounds to provide a wildlife habitat in an
urban setting and an environmental focus for education. 
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Value for money 
In the original UK PFI model, the government only
approved the PFI financing scheme if it demonstrated
that it produced VFM when compared with the traditional
methods of procurement, ie it generated savings to the
public sector during the whole-life cycle of the
concession. This was done by comparing the contract
costs with the Public Sector Comparator, which is
calculated by costing what the public sector would have
to pay to procure the construction as well as the
operation and maintenance of the school over the period
of the concession. To render the PFI project viable the city
council contributed £200 000 (20%), otherwise it would
not have been possible to produce a favourable
comparison with the PSC. 
Key messages
For the private sector
The Sewell Group went into the PFI market following a
long–term strategy of return on investment and
regarding PFI as an opportunity for investment of their
disposable cash. It invested £250 000 of its own money
(25%) recurring to traditional bank loans for financial
leverage (55%). The group tends to opt for low risk PFI
projects (such as schools) and expects a return on
investment of an average 12-15% instead of 5% in bank
deposits. The group also sees PFI as a strategy to smooth
the cycles in the construction industry (usually ten year
cycles). In times of depression for the construction
industry the company then has a secure revenue stream. 
The Sewell Group’s involvement in PFI projects changed
their attitude to business as they believe they are now
more service rather than asset-oriented. Being held
responsible for the school’s operation and maintenance
forced the group to carefully consider whole life cycle
costing. The group is a strong advocate of small PFI
projects for small companies, such as a school which can
cost up to £5 million. The group’s use of local labour even
when constructing outside Hull promotes local
employment, which is so important in depressed areas,
whether in Hull or elsewhere. This local involvement also
helps to ensure good maintenance in non-centralised
locations. For instance, a large facilities management
company can take longer to replace parts. 
A partnership approach is always beneficial as a way of
promoting cooperation between all the parties involved.
The decision taken by Sewell to promote a ‘community
dividend’ from the profits of the SPV is a good example of
this approach. Joint ventures are a viable solution when
any of the partners do not have the financial strength to
undertake the project. In this case, Kingston Upon Hull
City Council contributed with £200 000, otherwise it
would not have been possible to obtain a favourable
comparison with the PSC. 
Previous experience is equally important. The Sewell Group
had previous experience of constructing schools as well as a
great deal of involvement and expertise in building
maintenance and refurbishment in schools and hospitals. As
a result, when Sewell decided to enter the PFI market they built
upon their previous expertise and core business, adjusting
their approach to a long term perspective of operation and
management. The focus on reducing maintenance and repair
costs was a critical issue during the project’s development
– Sewell was entirely responsible for building maintenance.
For the public sector 
Small projects undertaken by municipalities are generally very
sensitive to local social and economic environments. The
primary lenders appointed a construction management
consultancy to provide technical advice. This consulting
company considered the Victoria Dock Primary School
scheme as a ‘bad PFI’. However, following a concerted
campaign by the headteacher and the formation of a ‘local’
partnership between a local contractor and owner of
construction and facilities management companies, the
technical consultants considered a big contractor would
have been in a better position to achieve economies of
scale and therefore reduce overall cost. Effectively it was
necessary to obtain the public partner’s contribution to
make possible a favourable comparison with the PSC. 
This raises the political issue of the social dimension of
local authorities’ small projects which require a delicate
balance to be struck between local relations and strict
profitability that in principle favours large companies
with large economies of scale. The benefit of utilising
local labour for the project was not considered within this
evaluation. In projects where reliance is put strictly on
local contacts, there is a potential for inefficient contract
awards. Careful auditing of the ‘local social benefit’ is
necessary to avoid reductions in VFM. If five or more
school projects can be ‘bundled’, the larger contracting
companies are interested in bidding. One school PFI
project alone is not sufficiently attractive. 
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A PFI contract in the education sector relieves education staff
from administrative and managerial tasks. The role of the
head teacher in premises management becomes one of a
performance monitor. For example, if a lamp is not replaced
within the pre-set period, a report is made and penalty
points are given, potentially affecting the unit price of the
service, and affecting the revenue of the concessionaire. 
The legal complexities of the PFI regime caused the local
authority in this case to incur increased legal costs.
However, it is unclear whether this was a result of the size
of the scheme or the novelty of the procurement method
and lack of expertise.
It should, however, be remembered that without the PFI
scheme a purpose-built local primary school would not
have been built.
Conclusions
Based upon an evaluation of the stimulants and
impediments to successful implementation of PFI projects
this school represents an exceptionally successful project.
Despite the technical consultant’s declaration that this
was a ‘bad PFI’, independent observation and critical
analysis suggests otherwise. It could in fact act as an
exemplar of SME involvement in PFI projects.
Further investigation: It would be beneficial to review the
operations and maintenance financial model when
compared to local authority maintained premises. A
benchmark operation and maintenance model could be
prepared to validate the benefits, or otherwise, of this PFI
scheme. Such benchmark data would be useful for future
PFI educational project appraisals.
The projected ‘social dividend’ should be evaluated over
the entire concession life. This could have a significant
impact on the project’s comparison with the original PSC.
The ‘local social benefit’ during the construction phase
should also be evaluated and included in a recalculation
of the scheme comparison with the PSC.
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Vasco de Gama Bridge
Location: Lisbon, Portugal
Project cost: €850 million and €120 million refinancing in
July 2000
Sector: Transport – Bridge Crossing – New Bridge. 17.2 km
construction and refurbishment and upgrading of
existing Abril 25th Bridge and new build of
interconnecting sections.
Status: Operational. Finance agreement closed in 1994.
Construction completed 31 March 2001. Contract Permit
to Use 24 March 2001.
Sponsors: Concessionaire/Lead Manager – Lusoponte
(consortia of UK, French and Portuguese contractors) and
Gestiponte (toll operators under franchise from
Lusoponti).
Purchaser: Authority: GATTEL a Portuguese government
agency.
Contractual package and concession period: Bespoke ‘PFI’
style agreement, including EU and World Bank finance and
reversionary licence for traffic over original 25 de Abril
crossing. Original end on 24 March 2028 (or 2250m vehicle
crossings). Renegotiated within a global settlement for
government changes to extend until 24 March 2030, 
with the removal of the traffic cap.
Background – history and objectives
In 1991 the ‘25 de Abril’ road bridge was the only
connection between the north and south banks of the
River Tagus within 40km of Lisbon’s city centre. A second
crossing was urgently needed to reduce serious traffic
congestion and to allow the development of the south
bank of the Tagus for new industrial projects.
Bidding process – chronology of key events
Business case approved in 1991 
EOI (OJEC) 1993
Contract and financial close agreed in 1994 
Operation of original crossing commences 25 April 1996 
New bridge operational in 1998
Concession ends in 2030.
Construction phase
Of the original initial cost €645 million was for new
construction work, the balance being associated with
maintenance costs for both bridges and payments for
expropriated land, re-housing and environmental relief
projects. The design life of the bridge structure is 120
years and consequently some inter-tidal zone piling was
taken down to 100m rather than 60m. The increased
depth and additional salt-corrosion measures meant
that the marine piles were typically twice the diameter 
of corresponding land piles.
Due to legal delays in contract signing the contractors
supported additional temporary site installations and
commenced preparatory operations without any
contractual protection. All such costs were totally at risk
until contract signing. This was determined to be a more
effective risk management strategy than awaiting
contract execution and absorbing the delay within the
concession programme.
Operational phase
The ‘new’ bridge operation commenced reasonably
effectively. However, the ‘take-over’ of the existing bridge
proved much more difficult than anticipated. Eventually, a
completely revised toll collection system was installed on
the ‘old’ bridge. This proved to be the only way to manage
the control and monitoring of cash payments from toll
booth to reconciliation at bank. Approximately 5% of all
traffic attempted to avoid toll payment. The enforcement
system relied upon video recording of vehicle registrations
and manual follow up. It took four years for legislation to
come into force giving powers to the SPV to clamp down
on toll evasions.
Risk transfer
A detailed SLEEPT risk analysis is presented below.
However, a number of unusual exogenous risks need to
be identified. There was a lack of consistent government
will. This resulted in a number of regulatory and technical
changes. For example, the government was unable to
implement contractual changes to the toll charges – 
local residents blockaded the bridges and refused to 
move until the proposed toll increases were cancelled. 
The government was forced to issue coupons for discount
toll charges (10% discount for 20 tickets and 20% discount
for more than 20 crossings per month). Environmental
groups put concerted pressure on Lusoponte and the
concessionaire faced enquiries for alleged violations of
Environmental Impact Study requirements.
Environmental design changes meant a 4.5 km viaduct
rather than an embankment, resulting in construction
cost increases of €125 million. These and other enforced
changes were negotiated within a global settlement, 
in 2001, to restore the original financial balance within
the concession.
Case study 3
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Table 3.4: SLEEPT analysis of major risks
Major risk Risk issue Risk impact Risk holder Risk management
category rating strategy
3 high 1 low
Social Expropriation difficulties (CPO’s) 1 Lusoponti Accepted. Incorporated in 
original financial balance
Local disruption and disturbance 1 Lusoponti Accepted. Incorporated in 
original financial balance
Damage to reputation after blockade protest 2 Lusoponti Unanticipated – 
public relations exercise
Legal General legislation and tax changes 1 Lusoponti/Gestiponti Accepted as general 
business risk
Toll default 1 Lusoponti/Gestiponti Due diligence and accepted
Economic Interest rate changes 3 Lusoponti Project contingency €40m
Finance shielding 2 European Investment Flexible financing structure
Bank (EIB) over 20 year term
Toll default 2 Gestiponti/Portuguese Accepted for four years
Government until legislation passed. 
Agreement to 40% of fines 
levy as compensation for
additional burden
Environmental Additional EIS requirements 2 Lusoponti Accepted
Design changes due to EIS revisions 3 Lusoponti/Portuguese Accepted. Altered the financial
Government balance and GSA (General
Settlement Agreement)
Remediation measures in 2 Portuguese Government GSA €6m
Special Protection Area
Political & Inconsistency of government will 3 Lusoponti Project management and 
Regulatory communication/information
strategies
Third bridge 1 Lusoponti Major involvement in 
pre-feasibility development
Buzinao (blockade protest) 3 Portuguese Government GSA
Technological Late approval of project details 3 Lusoponti/ Project management and 
sub-contractors technical expertise brought in
Design development 3 Lusoponti/Portuguese Design developments cost
Government €16m, of which €12.5
recovered from Gov’t.
Scheduled completion date 3 Sub contractors Delays and damages clauses 
in construction contracts
Traffic risks/ volumes 1 Gestiponti Accepted – mitigated by
operating both bridges
Operation/maintenance risks 2 Gestiponti Management systems
knowledge management,
whole life cycle costing,
improved traffic 
management systems
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Value for money 
Public Sector Comparator: No PSC exists in Portugal.
However, PFI was the only mechanism available to the
Portuguese government to deliver this project. At this
time considerable fiscal pressure was being applied by 
the EU to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
Value for money: The VFM evaluation of ‘the only show 
in town’ is impracticable. However, recent indications
suggest that the Government is intent on incorporating 
a third crossing within this concession agreement, an
indication of government acceptance of value for money.
Key messages
For the private sector 
The social, legal, environmental, political and regulatory
risks associated with a long term concession caused
enormous problems in this case. The advantages often
associated with innovative activity appear to have been
counteracted by unanticipated risks that occurred, hence
the legal actions and the 2002 General Settlement Agreement. 
Government legislation also became necessary to enforce
toll violation charges, when issued by a private company
rather than a government department. This primary
legislation took four years to enact. 
The creation of innovative solutions to prove the viability
of the finance mechanism – the transfer of the income
from the original bridge toll income to the concession -
ameliorated the risks associated with determining the
effect of route transfer of vehicles between the two crossings.
The risk transfer mechanism did not specify which risks
are taken entirely or shared by the public sector and
instead forwards the renegotiations to relatively
undefined events that might affect the financial balance
of the concession. This mechanism must be avoided in
future to avoid complicated litigation.
The shareholding composition for this project changed during
construction and, soon after completion, it changed again.
The inter-related and changing shareholdings of
Macquarie, one of the world’s largest toll road operators,
Kvaerner/Trafalgar House, Odebrecht and the Vinci Group
meant that the strategic management of the project was
in a state of flux. However, the ability to divest early and
still obtain reasonable returns on investment is a
significant advantage for the contractors. 
Table 3.5: Project funding
Finance Source Value Notes
European Union 
Cohesion Fund €320m (35%) Non-reimbursable
European 
Investment Bank €115m (13%) In Deutsche Marks
€185m (21%) In Portuguese Escudos
Term of 20 years with no
capital repayment for first
10 years, fixed interest rate
for first 15 years.
Existing revenues €50m (6%) From 25 de Abril Bridge
Government €164m (18%)
grants etc
Shareholders €66m (7%) Share capital €25m
Supplementary equity € 35m
Deferred ‘Suprimentos’ €6m
Table 3.6: Equity participators
Shareholder Co. % Holding 1999 % Holding 2000
Kvaerner Con. Intl. Norway, (formerly Trafalgar House Con. Special Projects) UK 24.80 1.00
Campenon Bernard SGE, (Part of Vinci Group of Co.s) France 22.00 22.00
BPC- Bento Pedroso Construcoes SA. Portugal, (Part of Odebrecht Organisation, Brazil) 14.84 14.84
Mota & Companhia SA, Portugal. 13.83 13.83
Somague, Sociedade de Construcoes, SA, Portugal 13.83 13.83
Teixeira Duarte – Engenharia & Construcoes SA, Portugal 7.50 7.50
Sociedade de Constructoes H Hagen. SA Portugal (Part of Vinci Group, France) 2.80 2.80
Edifer Construcoes Pires Coelho & Fernandes SA, Portugal 0.40 0.40
Macquarie Infrastrucure Ltd, UK (Part of Macquarie Bank, Australia) 0.00 23.80
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For the public sector:
Portugal has a different economic, social, environmental
and regulatory framework from the UK, France or Brazil.
The most important issue that occurred was the
extensive litigation between Lusoponte and GATTEL. The
‘freezing’ of the proposal and its consequent financial
balance is vital to avoid the difficulties associated with
negotiation of global settlements for enforced changes
beyond the control of the concessionaire. 
The existence of clear and concise ‘compulsory purchase
order’ legislation is vital to the financial viability of major
projects. The delays in achieving CPOs had an effect on
the financial balance for the project. There was an
element of ‘land price escalation’ that occurred and a
number of attempts to ‘ransom’ the project by delays in
execution of CPOs.
The local and regional government also underestimated
the potential impact that the general public could have
on a major project, as illustrated by the blockade protest.
Political control was compromised by having to concede
to local demands. 
Conclusions
Despite due diligence, a number of unforeseen problems
occurred, one related to alterations to an existing contract
that was transferred to the concessionaire for use of the
‘old’ bridge. Another related to a legislation gap that left
the concessionaire exposed to significant under-recovery
against the original financial balance model. 
Despite financing a larger sum until the General
Settlement Agreement, the project has successfully
operated for six years. It is too early to examine the
operations and maintenance forecasts within the
financial balance. However, traffic flow has grown beyond
the most optimistic forecasts and the concession
condition requiring the preliminary development of the
feasibility and viability model for a further bridge crossing
has already been instigated. However, no conclusions
have yet been reached.
Further investigation: The operations and maintenance
forecasts and the whole life-cycle costs for the crossing
should be re-examined in view of the increased traffic
flows to inform future predictions for road construction
projects.
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Case study 4
Location: Liverpool, United Kingdom
Project cost: £247 million
Sector: Security/detention
Status: Operational. First prisoners arrived in 
December 1997
Sponsors & concessionaire/lead manager:
Group4/Tarmac
Purchaser: Her Majesty’s Prison Service (HMPS) on behalf
of the UK Government
Contractual package & concession period: A 25 year
contract concession was concluded. The project sponsors
executed capitalisation of the project privately.
Special features: One of the first two PFI prison projects
within the UK. Construction ran concurrently for both
projects, although using different concessionaires and
lead managers. The concessionaire is responsible for all
custodial and ancillary services such as catering,
education and medical facilities. A partnering approach
was adopted between HMPS and concessionaires. (There
is no published explication of this requirement. However,
government-sponsored construction industry reports, eg
Latham (1995) and Egan (1998) were receiving significant
government recognition and major political initiatives
were being developed which openly advocated the
adoption of partnering within construction activity).
Background – history and objectives
In September 1993, in response to the overcrowding in
the UK’s existing 132 prisons, the Home Secretary
announced that the first two, of six, new prisons would
be procured using PFI. Sixty consortia attended a pre-
tender conference. The contracts were for a 600 place
prison at Fazakerley, now known as HMP Altcourse, and
an 800 place prison at Bridgend, now called HMP Parc.
(See case study 5).
Bidding process – chronology of key events
As indicated in table 3.7, the tendering process from
notification of intention to the formal award of contract
lasted 27 months. The establishment of the initial short-
list took seven months. From short-list to initial tender
required a further eight months. However, all of the short-
listed bidders made qualifications that made all of the
received bids non-compliant. The most significant
qualifications from the bidders related to issues of the
unacceptability of risk transfer from client to
concessionaire, especially in relation to occupancy and
under-utilisation of available places. 
This necessitated an amendment to bid conditions and
resulted in the subsequent alteration of the procurement
route from restricted to negotiated tenders. The period
required to complete these contractual amendments was
four months followed by a re-tendering period of two
months. Further negotiations took place over a three
month period before HMPS announced preferred bidders
for both projects. A further period of approximately eight
months passed before the formal contract was executed.  
Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Altcourse
Table 3.7: Chronology of key events
Sept. 1993 Home Secretary announces plans to
procure two new prisons under the PFI
Nov. 1993 HMPS publishes Official Journal of the
European Commuinity notice. 60
consortia attend conference. 10 consortia
seek further information
Mar. 1994 HMPS short-list six consortia for 
tender list
June 1994 Lazard appointed as financial advisors 
to HMPS 
July 1994 One consortium disqualified after
acquisition/merger activity
Nov. 1994 HMPS receives initial tenders. 
Coopers & Lybrand appointed as project
managers for both schemes. All tenders
prove to be non-compliant. Procurement
route amended from ‘restricted’ to
‘negotiated’ tender
Feb.1995 Formal issue of revised tenders to five
remaining consortia
Mar. 1995 HMPS holds further discussions with
three bidders
May 1995 HMPS announces preferred bidders for
both projects
Dec. 1995 Contract for Altcourse prison signed with
Group 4/Tarmac
Dec. 1997 Altcourse prison receives first prisoners
27Quantifying quality   Chapter three: case studies
In March 1994, HMPS informed the six preferred bidders
that both prisons would not be awarded to a single
bidder. The first round of tenders in November 1995
proved to be non-compliant, owing to concerns by the
bidding contractors over the principle of occupancy risk. 
In order to obtain compliant tenders, and on the advice 
of Lazard and the Treasury Solicitor, occupancy risk was
shifted back to the public sector. The two projects were
not readvertised because it was thought the first round 
of tendering had identified all likely bidders and the
Prison Service did not wish to delay matters further. 
After issuing revised tenders to the five remaining bidders
in February 1995, the information relating to the
restriction of both contracts not being awarded to the
same bidder was omitted.
This re-tender produced the following results. 
they subsequently calculated to have been up to 5% of
total bid was a saving of a further £24million.
Independent construction advisors WS Atkins have
subsequently concluded that a more realistic reduction
for the award of both contracts could be considered to be
3%, which still equates to a further £16 million. The NAO
placed major reservations over the conduct of the award
process. After major concerns had been raised, the
Director General of the Prison Service responded in
person to severe Parliamentary questions. 
Construction phase
The construction contract terms relating to price
variations were complex and, in some important areas,
might have been capable of more than one interpretation,
particularly as to whether changes in costs such as
utilities, bank interest, VAT and other taxation changes
could trigger a price increase. However, it appears that
the original estimates were sufficient to avoid litigation.
The additional house-block was added after
commencement and was therefore a negotiated price.
Table 3.8: HMP Altcourse bids and the PSC comparison
Comsortia Bids PSC 
difference Notes
Securicor/
Costain 221 -65 Declined due to
successful bid on
Bridgend project
Group4/Tarmac 252 -33 Accepted Bid
subject to
subsequent
further
negotiations
Premier Prison 
Services 272 +48
Public Sector 
Comparator 248 -
Despite the fact that the Securicor/Costain consortium
was the lowest bid the Prison Service opted to award
Fazakerley to the Group4/Tarmac consortium.
Group4/Tarmac’s bid for HMP Altcourse was scrutinised
and revisions to the bid resulted in the accepted tender
being reduced by £5million. This brought the contract
sum down to £247million – £1million below the PSC.
Further alterations issued by HMPS resulted in a variation
order for an extra 118-place house block. The costs
associated with this variation have not been recorded in
any of the statistics contained within this paper.
However, when examined, and based on the accepted
tender figure of £247million for HMP Altcourse the saving
is only £1 million. Awarding the two contracts to separate
bidders represented foregone savings of £31 million. This
also ignored the statement by Securicor/Costain to both
the NAO and HMPS that, for the award of both contracts,
a further discount would have been negotiable. A figure
HMPS
Design 
team
Architect
Consulting
engineer
Quantity
surveyor
Operator
Construction
team
Tarmac
M&E
Other 
sub-contactor
Operating
team
Carillion FM
& Group4
Maintenance
contractor
Medical,
educational
contractor
Funding
Carillion
private finance
Legal advisor
Technical
advisor
Insurance
advisor
SPV
Table 3.1: HMP Altcourse project management structure
A successful project management strategy was
implemented, with significant emphasis placed upon
activity durations. HMP Altcourse became operational in
December 1997. This represented a time saving in the
region of 45% on comparable prisons built under
traditional procurement.
Operational phase
Parts of the concessionaire’s charges are increased
automatically each year by an indexation formula and 
the concessionaire can claim for other price increases
arising from factors beyond their control relating to
operation and maintenance. 
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HMPS has an unusual ‘step-in’ provision in which they 
are liable to repay part or all of the sponsors’ project
borrowings if the contract is terminated after the prison
is complete and/or if the operator defaults and no
alternative operator is willing to run the completed prison
under the original operational performance specification.
Lazard estimated that the maximum payable by HMPS
under this arrangement would be £84 million but the
actual amount payable would be less if any of the
contractor’s borrowings had been repaid or if the
outstanding value of the contract was less than the
borrowings. HMPS would be allowed to deduct from the
amount of money payable any additional expenses they
expect to incur in obtaining the required level of service
for the remainder of the original contract period.  
After testing this ‘step-in’ provision in competition, 
HMPS came to the view that it was obliged to accept this
arrangement in order to make the projects acceptable 
to bidders. 
Table 3.9 shows that, on average, staff unit costs were 
21% lower and staff costs per prisoner were 33% lower.  
In table 3.10,  analysing the relative contributions to the
staff cost difference shows that lower unit costs account for
52% and the lower staff numbers for 48% of the difference.
Risk transfer
The risk allocation and risk acceptance by the prospective
bidders was a major problem on this project. HMPS tried
unsuccessfully to allocate virtually all risks to the bidders.
This resulted in a first round of tender submissions that
were all non-compliant. The submitted bids contained
significant qualifications that caused the HMPS advisors to
reject all first round bids. Following extensive negotiation
with central government, HMPS re-allocated risks and, in
particular, accepted full liability for all occupancy-related
risks. In order to obtain compliant tenders, and on the
advice of Lazard and the Treasury Solicitor, occupancy risk
was shifted back to the public sector.
As previously stated, an unusual ‘step-in’ provision was
created to make the operational terms acceptable to
prospective bidders. This was not unreasonable for the
first of this new ‘breed’ of prison. However, it was
expected that this provision would be eliminated after
operational experience had been achieved.
Value for money
The PSC was only marginally improved upon by £1
million. It should also be noted that the ‘original’
submitted bid was £252 million, exceeding the PSC 
by £4 million. 
Table 3.9: Comparison of staff costs per prisoner and unit
cost of staff (Public to PFI) 
Average difference
Staff unit cost -21%
Staff cost per prisoner -33%
Proportion of staff cost difference due to: 
Lower staff unit cost 52%
Fewer staff 48%
Source: NAO
Table 3.10: Employee costs comparison (Public Service to PFI) 
Average difference
Employee unit cost -22%
Salary -14%
Pension costs* -86%
Overtime -65%
* The Civil Service pension scheme is non-contributory and offers generous
benefits at obvious cost.
Source: NAO
Table 3.11: Selected bid against PSC 
HMP Altcourse
£ million
Selected Bid 252
Awarded Contract Value 247
Public Sector Comparator 248
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The political ‘market-making’ decision has been described
previously. Table 3.12 provides additional details of the bid
information available at the time the contract awards
were made. 
The figures show that in terms of net value, Lowdham
Grange is 21% lower cost than Bridgend and 36% lower
than Altcourse.  These statistics are included because they
have been used to demonstrate that a ‘market’ in PFI
prisons appears to have been created and that
competition in this ‘market’ may have driven down
contract costs. However, caution must be used since the
specification at Lowdham Grange is not directly
comparable with the other two contracts. 
When compared with the published HMPS costs,
Altcourse creates savings of over £8 283 per prisoner per
year. Assuming maximum occupancy of 600 prisoners this
is an annual saving of £4.97 million, and is equivalent to
£124 million savings over the 25 year concession period. 
Table 3.12: The leading bids against PSC 
Consortia Proposed contract prices (£ million) Combined PSC difference (£ million)
Bridgend PSC difference Fazakerley PSC Combined Combined 
difference bid total PSC difference
Securicor/Costain 254 -65 221 -27 475 -92
Group4/Tarmac 286 -33 252 +4 538 -29
Premier Prison Services 367 +48 272 +24 639 +72
Public sector 319 - 248 - 567 -
comparator (PSC)
Both the NAO and the House of Commons Public
Expenditure Committee questioned the Director of HMPS.
The response from HMPS was that, as these were the first
PFI prison projects, two factors led to the conclusion not
to award both contracts to the same consortium, namely:
• There was no proven track record in successful PFI prison
project delivery
• It was necessary to create a ‘competitive market’ in PFI
prison building.
Awarding both contracts to the same consortium 
would have increased identifiable project delivery risks 
to an unacceptable level for HMPS and would have
diminished project experience for subsequent PFI prison
projects. HMPS rejected the contention that acceptance
of separate bids at an additional £55 million was an
expensive method of creating a ‘competitive market’ and
managing an identifiable project risk.
In the available public records there is no evidence of
questioning about the disparity of awarded contract
and individual PSCs. The question of why one consortium
can bid at approximately 17% below PSC and the other
project is bid at only 0.4% below PSC remains
unanswered. A further question arises as to whether the
Altcourse project (at 0.4% below PSC) could be considered
to demonstrably offer better value for money by adopting
a PFI approach. Once again the question remains
unanswered in public records.
Following these two contracts a third PFI prison contract
of £131 million was let at Lowdham Grange in
Nottingham. Kvaerner Construction acted as the main
contractor. (A detailed study of this project is not included
in this text; however certain significant statistics have
been presented for illustrative purposes).
Table 3.13: Comparison of annual prisoner costs of first three
private prisons  
Bridgend Altcourse Lowdham 
Grange*1
Net value of total
contract price £266m £247m £131m
Number of 
places 800 600 500
Net average 
annual cost*2 £13 300 £16 467 £10 480
*1 Lowdham Grange is not directly comparable since it is incapable of housing
Category A, remand or un-sentenced prisoners. Category A prisoners require the
highest conditions of security. Remand and un-sentenced prisoners require high
levels of supervision because of the high risk of damage to property or self harm.   
*2 The average public sector cost per prisoner is £24 750 
Source: HMPS
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Key messages
For the private sector
• The corporate objective of achieving competitive
advantage via differentiation and a niche market
strategy may be hampered by the government’s wish 
to create a ‘competitive market’
• Political risk factors assume major significance in
contract success
• The gestation period for projects of this nature is long
• Abortive tendering costs (in the event of an
unsuccessful bid) can be considerable
•  Restrictions on the number of concurrent projects
awarded to a single company may occur
• The contractors incorporation of ‘innovative design’
bids based upon changes to accepted practice may 
be criticised by the awarding panel and/or subject
to alteration.
For the public sector
•  There is a need for the project award panel to have an
open-minded view of the project solution. PFI is based
upon whole life-cycle performance and not exclusively
on traditional design solutions
•  Effective risk allocation at an early stage in the project
brief can reduce the project gestation period and
eliminate the need for multiple-stage tendering and
pre-award negotiations over risk acceptance
•  There is a need for a stable project brief. Client-initiated
changes are not easily assimilated under this
procurement regime
•  There is a need for the client team to assess value for
money on a like-for-like basis. Questions over great
differences between accepted bid and the PSC should
be resolved at an early stage
Conclusions
HMP Altcourse was an innovative approach to security
/detention provision within the UK. As has been
indicated, the earliest projects in any particular market
sector are subject to significant ‘political’ machinations.
Many of these have been identified within the case 
study details.
HMPS rejected numerous proposals relating to
construction, layout and operations, significantly
hampering the ability of the private sector to improve
value for money. However, it should be remembered that
this project became operational in a significantly reduced
timescale. The NAO reported a time saving of 45% on
traditional procurement.
The project also reveals significant cost savings on 
the operational aspects of the project and a like-for-like
saving of £124million over the 25 year concession is a
considerable saving. However, the case study indicates
that a majority of these savings relate to staffing costs
associated with the terms and conditions of employment
of prison officers as private employees rather than 
public employees.
Subsequent to operational commencement, the SPV
sought to refinance the project from the finance market.
The consortium obtained significantly improved financial
packages at this time, further improving the financial
viability of the project. 
Further investigation: is suggested to validate the
operational costing for the detention provisions. An
examination of the potential for further cost reductions
by eliminating the restrictions on construction materials
and project layout is also recommended.
The issue of full disclosure of all relevant information 
is raised by this case study. Further research and
published guidance is needed as to the extent of
disclosure that is required to allow the accurate
determination of the financial model. Non-disclosure or
partial disclosure raises issues relating to the genuineness
of agreement between the sponsor and SPV. This issue
has not been tested in UK courts.
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Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Parc
Location: Bridgend, United Kingdom
Project cost: £266 million
Sector: Security/detention
Status: Operational. First prisoners accepted in 
November 1997
Sponsors: Securicor/Costain
Purchaser: HMPS on behalf of the UK Government
Contractual package and concession period: A twenty-five
year contract concession was concluded. The project
sponsors executed capitalisation of the project privately.
Special features: One of the first two PFI prison projects
within the UK. Construction ran concurrently for both
projects, although using different concessionaires and lead
managers. The concessionaire is responsible for all custodial
and ancillary services such as catering, education and
medical facilities. A partnering approach was adopted
between HMPS and concessionaires. [There is no published
explication of this requirement. However, government
sponsored construction industry reports, eg Latham (1995)
and Egan (1998) were receiving significant government
recognition and major political initiatives were being
developed which openly advocated the adoption of
partnering within construction activity.]
Note: This case study was conducted concurrently with HMP
Altcourse at Fazakerley, Liverpool. Since much of the detail
has already been presented in case study 4, this shortened
case study only provides information that is unique to HMP
Parc. The analysis of key messages, conclusions and
acknowledgements has not been repeated here, but should
be referred to for a complete project synopsis. 
Background – history and objectives
In September 1993, in response to the overcrowding 
of the UK’s existing 132 prisons, the Home Secretary
announced that the first two, of six, new prisons would
be procured using PFI. Sixty consortia attended a 
pre-tender conference. The contracts were for an 800
place prison at Bridgend, now called HMP Parc and a 600
place prison at Fazakerley, now known as HMP Altcourse. 
(See case study 4).
Bidding process – chronology of key events
Case study 5
Table 3.14: Chronology of key events
Date Activity
Sept. 1993 Home Secretary announces plans to
procure two new prisons under the PFI
Nov. 1993 HMPS publishes OJEC notice. 60 consortia
attend conference. 10 consortia seek
further information
Mar. 1994 HMPS short-list six consortia for 
tender list
June 1994 Lazard appointed as financial advisors 
to HMPS 
July 1994 One consortium disqualified after
acquisition/merger activity
Nov. 1994 HMPS receives initial tenders. Coopers &
Lybrand appointed as project managers
for both schemes. All tenders prove to 
be non-compliant. Procurement route
amended from restricted to 
negotiated tender
Feb.1995 Formal issue of revised tenders to five
remaining consortia
Mar. 1995 HMPS holds further discussions with
three bidders
May 1995 HMPS announces preferred bidders for
both projects
Jan. 1996 Contract for Bridgend prison signed with
Securicor/Costain
Nov. 1997 HMP Parc receives first prisoners
In March 1994, HMPS informed the six remaining bidders
that both projects would not be awarded to a single
bidder. Both Parc and Altcourse were tendered concurrently.
The first round of tenders in November 1995 proved to be
non-compliant, due to concerns by the bidding contractors
over the principle of occupancy risk. In order to obtain
compliant tenders, and on the advice of Lazard and the
Treasury Solicitor, occupancy risk was shifted back to the
public sector. The two projects were not re-advertised
because it was thought the first round of tendering had
identified all likely bidders and HMPS did not wish to delay
matters further. However, after issuing revised tenders to
the five remaining bidders in February 1995, the
information relating to the exclusion of an award being
made to the same bidder for both projects was omitted.
Table 3.14 presents a chronology of the key events.
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Table 3.15: Submitted bids and PSC comparison for both prisons
Consortia Proposed contract prices (£million) Combined PSC difference (£million)
HMP Parc PSC difference HMP Altcourse PSC Combined Combined 
difference bid total PSC difference
Securicor/ Costain 254 -65 221 -27 475 -92
Group4/ Tarmac 286 -33 252 +4 538 -29
Premier Prison Services 367 +48 272 +24 639 +72
Public sector 319 - 248 - 567 -
comparator (PSC)
Securicor/Costain subsequently submitted the lowest
bids for both projects. Details are provided in table 3.15.
Despite the fact that the Securicor/Costain consortium
submitted the lowest bid for each project and therefore
was the lowest composite bid, the prison service opted to
award only Parc to Securicor/Costain for a sum of £266
million and awarded Altcourse to another consortia.
The Prison Service insisted on subsequent modifications
to the Bridgend design accounting for the additional
£12 million.
These decisions represented an overall saving, on both
prisons, of £54 million, compared to public finance of the
building work and contracting out of operations (when
compared using the published PSC). 
However, when examined, and based on accepted tender
figures of £266 million for HMP Parc, the saving is
£53 million on Parc. Awarding the two contracts to
separate bidders represented foregone savings of a
further £31 million. This also ignored the statement by
Securicor/Costain to both the NAO and HMPS, that for the
award of both contracts, a further discount would have
been negotiable. A figure they subsequently calculated to
have been up to 5% of total bid was a saving of a further
£24 million. Independent construction advisors, WS
Atkins, have concluded that a more realistic reduction for
the award of both contracts could be considered to be 3%
However, this still equates to an additional £16 million.
Construction phase
The Securicor/Costain design was scrutinised and HMPS
variations resulted in an increase in the contract sum to
£266 million.
Operational phase
HMP Parc became operational in November 1997. This
represented a time saving in the region of 45% on
comparable prisons built under traditional procurement.
HMPS
Design 
team
Architect
Consulting
engineer
Quantity
surveyor
Operator
Construction
team
Costain/
Skanska
M&E
Other
sub-contactor
Operating
team
Securicor
Maintenance
contractor
Medical,
educational
contractor
Funding
NatWest/
Lloyds
Legal advisor
Technical
advisor
Insurance
advisor
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Risk transfer 
The discrepancy in the differences between awarded
contract sums and the appropriate PSC is quite
remarkable. These discrepancies and the potential
foregone savings of a further £55 million (because of the
reluctance to award both contracts to the same
consortium) caused a significant political concern. Both
the NAO and The House of Commons Public Expenditure
Committee questioned the Director of HMPS. The
response from HMPS was that as these were the first PFI
prison projects, two factors led to the conclusion not to
award both contracts to the same consortium, namely:
• There was no proven track record in successful PFI prison
project delivery
• It was necessary to create a ‘competitive market’ in PFI
prison building.
Awarding both contracts to the same consortium would
have increased identifiable project delivery risks to an
unacceptable level for HMPS and would have diminished
project experience for subsequent PFI prison projects.
HMPS rejected the contention that acceptance of
separate bids at an additional £55 million was an
expensive method of creating a ‘competitive market’ and
managing an identifiable project risk.
Table 3.14: PFI bids and Public Sector Comparators
HMP Parc
Selected bid 254
Awarded contract value 266
Public sector comparator 319
Value for money
When compared with the published HMPS costs, HMP
Parc creates savings of over £11 450 per prisoner per year.
Assuming maximum occupancy of 800 prisoners this is
an annual saving of £9.16 million and is equivalent to
£229 million savings over the 25 year concession period. 
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Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC)
Location: Watchfield, Wiltshire, United Kingdom.
Project cost: Full financial details have not been disclosed.
The construction contract was £88 million
Sector: Education – training staff officers of all three
armed services
Status: : Operational. Finance agreement closed in 1998.
Construction ended 6 September 2000.
Sponsors: Concessionaire/lead manager – Defence
Management (Watchfield) Ltd.
The shareholders are: 
• Serco (50%), facilities management company and the
operation and maintenance service provider for JSCSC.
Serco runs scientific establishments, maintains
buildings, runs leisure centres, railways, etc 
• Laing Investments(25%) 
• Laing Hyder plc (25%), a specialist company set up to
invest and manage PFI projects. 
Purchaser: Secretary of State for Defence (Ministry of
Defence – MoD)
Contractual package and concession period: The PFI contract,
dated 5 June 1998, awarded to Defence Management the
design, construction, financing and the operation and
maintenance of the JSCSC for 30 years. The concession
contract had 52 clauses that constituted the main contract
relevant to either construction or service provision. There
were also 28 schedules. In total 30-35 different firm
agreements were involved. The concession ends in 2028.
Special features: The first PFI scheme in the defence 
sector combining education and estates, including housing,
training support services, mess accommodation 
support services. 
Background – history and objectives
The PFI contract, dated 5 June 1998, awards to Defence
Management the design, construction, financing and the
operation and maintenance of the JSCSC for 30 years. This
college merges the educational activities of three services:
Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. It provides
command and staff training at junior, advanced and
higher levels for all three services. The concession covers
the academic teaching, management of classrooms,
lecture theatres and offices, facilities for single occupancy
accommodation and 290 homes. The creation of the
JSCSC followed studies undertaken by the MoD and was
designed to:
• Maximise the opportunities for the common
understanding of the approach to warfare and defence
as a whole, consistent with the increasing importance
of the joint, combined, multinational and inter-agency
nature of future operations 
• Provide the potential for future development of the
college on a combined and interagency basis. 
The establishment of the JSCSC involved the closure of
the former staff colleges in the UK – the Joint Services
Defence College and the Royal Naval Staff College at
Greenwich, the Army Command and Staff College at
Camberley and the Royal Air Force Staff College at
Bracknell. The three Service Junior Divisions – Royal Navy
Junior Division, Army Junior Division and Royal Air Force
Junior Division – also moved to Shrivenham in August
2000, enabling all military command and staff training to
be delivered from one site. The MoD operates the policy
that for every required output or service, the PFI route has
to be explored and the decision to pursue as a PFI project
depends often on the MoD capital expenditure
requirement. MoD policy is that there is no declared
minimum capital or contract value threshold level below
which PFI need not be considered. The initial location for
this project was to be Camberley but the concessionaire
proposed Watchfield due to excessive costs. 
The criteria for site selection were: 
• To be within two hours travelling from Whitehall 
• Site cost
• Site extension provisions 
• Security
• The existence of local resources both during the
construction and the operational stages when it
employs about 250 civilian staff. 
The fact that there was a hospital nearby was also
considered advantageous. 
Construction and equipment of the buildings ended on 
6 September 2000 and the JSCSC officially opened on 
28 February 2001. The college has around 2200 students
from the three services considered to be the top 10% of
the armed forces. Foreign national servicemen also attend
the JSCSC. 
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Bidding process – chronology of key events
In June 1997, the MoD issued Invitations To Negotiate
(ITN) to a select list of bidders. On 5 June 1998, a PFI
contract was signed between MoD and Defence
Management (an SPV for Laing & Serco). The MoD set up
one of the best client project management teams that
Defence Management had encountered with sufficient
empowerment and executive decision powers. In contrast
the team from the construction sub-contractor was led by
a young and inexperienced manager. 
Construction phase
The construction sub-contract was a GMP contract
between Defence Management and Laing Construction
worth £88.85 million, and a fixed term of 113 weeks. The
construction phasing had eight defined stages with 102
defined work packages. 
The contract contained 28 Schedules. Schedule 5
(Construction Matters) was the most important
document for construction. Schedule 13 (Review
Procedure) caused difficulties for construction. Schedules
6, 7, 8 and 24 (Transfer Requirements; Equipment and
MoD Property; Service Requirement Specifications and
Method Statements; Services Mobilisation Requirements
respectively) were the most important documents for
Serco, along with 15 and 16 (Performance Monitoring
System and Availability Deduction Mechanism
respectively), which were reviewed by Serco. 
The MoD wanted to make the JSCSC a flagship project, so
the projected image was a key issue. The design was
required to
• Have a significant visual impact
• Emphasise the status
• Be aesthetic whilst also functional. 
The chosen design was modular, ie, repetitive to reduce
costs. The materials used were proven to reduce risks. 
Operational phase
Commercial arrangements have not been released. 
The operation/maintenance (O/M) sub-contract was
signed between Defence Management (Watchfield) Ltd
and Serco and was aimed at procuring the facilities
management equipment, recruiting the staff and putting
in place a facilities and task management for the support
services for the college. In total the SPV’s initial
investment was £5.8 million. It is a fixed price contract
over 30 years and represents a general gross income of
between £5-10 million per year paid monthly. Each service
is paid monthly against performance criteria with typical
monthly incomes from a service being between £10 000
and £200 000 a month, with deductions being made
where performance has failed to meet the correct levels.
Each service will have a range of six deficiency bands with
deductions ranging from 0% to 20% of income against
each band. 
The O/M sub-contract covers four main business areas: 
Teaching –The War Studies Group in the School of
Humanities at King’s College London, is sub-contracted 
by Serco to carry out the Academic Support Service. The
contract’s duration is ten years. The group provides a
Dean, 45 lecturers and support staff to deliver teaching 
in War Studies. The team includes over 38 on-site
academic staff linked to the Department of War Studies,
based at King’s Strand Campus 5. Taken together with
the University of London’s Centre for Defence Studies, 
also based at King’s, the grouping will be the largest
academic defence studies entity in Europe. The objective
of the Defence Studies Department at JSCSC is to be a
centre of excellence for teaching and research in defence
studies. It also has MoD military staff working together
with the academics. 
Training Services – Serco carries out the defined non-
technical services, ie library; IT services for both hardware
and software (the majority of the software was specially
developed by a consultant, and it controls the quality
system within the College); audio visual (Serco has seven
personnel controlling the classrooms, syndicate rooms
and eight major lecture theatres with a capacity ranging
from 40 to 800 persons). CCTV and TV cameras
interconnect the theatres and a lecture can be
simultaneously transmitted to all. Training resources
cover all the resources related with the teaching activities
ranging from secretarial and administrative support to
graphics, photography, photocopying, sports and travel. 
Estates - Serco carries out the security, facilities
management and estate management services, providing
all the grounds and buildings maintenance for the 100
acre site, which contain some 45 000 sq metres of college
facilities, 290 family quarters, and sports pitches
including two cricket grounds, an all weather hockey
pitch, tennis courts, a rugby and football pitch as well as
squash courts and a fitness suite.
Mess Services – Serco sub-contracted Eurest to carry out
catering and cleaning services. The catering is prepared
for 650 self-service persons per day and must also serve a
further 450 people with a silver service dinner. Serco
employs a staff of over 300. Within the organisational
structure there is a specialised Department of Quality,
Health and Safety. 
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Risk transfer
The following sections describe the most relevant risks
that proved to have an adverse effect on the development
of the JSCSC PFI project. 
Social Risks 
Impact on local infrastructure –There was, for
example, only one pub in the village, but with the 
influx of service personnel and their families and the
development of married quarters, new schools have 
also had to be provided. 
The new facility required increased numbers of non-
military staff. All of these new employees were required
to undergo extensive security clearance checks. At one
stage almost 50% of all potential recruits were rejected
because of security issues.
To facilitate non-military staff employment Defence
Management had to promote the use of local transport
and invest in the local bus network. 
Legal Risks
The concession contract (and 28 schedules) became an
implied document in the construction contract. Therefore
the requirements of an untried/untested PFI concession
became an implicit feature of all contractual negotiations.
The full implications of the implied terms were not
recognised in the GMP. Hence the reason for constructors
costs escalating from £88 million to approximately £120
million with no change in the GMP. 
Planning and construction approvals – traditionally UK
government departments have been exempt from Local
Authority Planning Approval Procedures (although by
custom and practice they have tried to comply). 
The implementation of the Humans Rights Act (HRA)
1998 and its application in October 2000 gave local
citizens a statutory right of appeal against infringements
of personal rights. There is a strong body of legal opinion
that government bodies (and by implication their agents
such as Defence Management) cannot interfere with
their rights by claims to Crown Immunity, as was
previously done. Therefore any ‘local’ complaints about
planning and/or construction approvals could potentially
lead to a claim under the HRA 1998. No
contingency/remediation from actions was contained in
the contracts and therefore liability for compliance
following any such action would be at the cost of the
concessionaire or constructor. To date there is no
knowledge of any action. However, there are social
implications – for example, the temporary shortage of
school places. 
Economic and financial risks 
The information brief was considered by the contractor 
to have been too poor, too loose and leaving too much
room for interpretation to the lead designer. The
consequence was that the contract was signed with
inadequate information to correctly budget for the
construction works. 
Insufficient specification - At the start of construction
only 5% of the drawings were available. Their quality was
poor and made effective estimation impossible. This
severely hindered the process, since the construction
contract was budgeted according to the philosophy of
GMP. At the time of signing the JSCSC construction
contract not even 50% of the design was known, making
it impossible to budget correctly. Even the choice of
materials was made as construction progressed. 
Service specifications – ‘fit for purpose’ was introduced in
the construction sub-contract to characterise the service
specifications of some construction items. It proved to be
the origin for several problems, because the purpose can
change depending on the client’s point of view. The most
striking example in this case is the ‘fit for purpose’ of a
fire escape outside the bar. During the commemoration of
Victory in Europe Day, people went out to see the flypast
and the excessive weight caused the balcony to bend. It
was designed for people to pass through not to stand, but
the construction sub-contractor was forced to redesign
and rebuild it as it was ‘not fit for purpose.’ It is important
to note that the concept of ‘fit for purpose’ is uninsurable
– no insurance company will cover this risk and it is
therefore the constructor taking the risk and not the
designer. The O/M sub-contract is a fixed price over 30
years, therefore inflation is the most important risk which
the project is subject to. 
Environmental risks
Flood water – The JSCSC was built to withstand an event
that would occur once every hundred years (1:100).
Unfortunately rain during the winter of 2000 was a 1:200
event, which caused flooding in the ground floor of the
main building and the lagoon overflowing in spite of the
drainage installed. 
Contamination – The 1:200 event caused mains sewerage
from on and off site to overflow into the containment
lagoon. This lagoon (also a landscape feature) was then
required to be pumped dry, with its previous stone lining
removed, the whole cover decontaminated and then
relined with a new stone lining and then refilled. These
risks had to be rectified at no additional cost to the
SPV/client and at the expense of the contractor..
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Political and regulatory risks 
Political advice – The JSCSC was a government flagship
project. It was therefore susceptible to state-of-the-art
industry practices such as the Zero Defects Initiative
introduced following political advice from the then
Department of the Environment Transport and the
Regions and the Partnering Initiative (which arose
following political advice from the Construction Best
Practice Programme). These requests were aimed at
obtaining a better project but constituted an additional
and unanticipated risk for the companies not familiar
with these management techniques. 
Client change – During the negotiations there was a
restructuring of the MoD that affected the normal
procedures. The risk was that the changes in MoD
personnel could bring changes to the project objectives.
The personal interpretation of prior agreements could
change either the scope or content of the project etc. 
Planning regulations surprises – At the time of the
signing of the contract Laing Construction assumed that
the construction was approved by the local authority
planning department. Laing was ready to start
construction when it was informed that the building
foundations would only be approved if two metres deeper
than originally estimated. The immediate consequence
was that the building’s foundations reached areas of very
bad sub-soil instead of rock as planned. Consequently,
costs escalated. 
Technological risks
Site conditions – One of the main problems was that the
construction sub-contractor encountered site conditions
related to ground water. Bad ground and excavations
below the water table occurred in excess of all reasonable
expectations at tender stage. The 1:200 floods caused a
significant alteration in ground water levels and ground
water content. The requirement for deeper excavations
for foundations increased the volume and technical
complexity of earthwork and sub-structure activity. The
construction sub-contractor, having agreed a GMP with
the concessionaire, did not lay-off its risk to their sub-
contractors. The construction sub-contracts were largely
‘traditional’ and allowed sub-contractors to obtain
reimbursement for variations in the works. 
Poor drainage – One of the main problems encountered
was poor drainage and this might have been related to
the alterations requested by the planning department to
lower the building by two metres. For phasing and access
reasons the construction sub-contractor had already built
the drainage network before knowing of the alteration
and, although they were ‘removed on paper’ as the pipes
were already in place, they were not physically removed. If
this should cause local flooding problems in the future,
there is the possibility of an action under the HRA by local
residents. These local residents could even be the
occupiers of the military family homes on site, who
historically have been unable to take any actions against
the MoD (and agents) because of claimed Crown
Immunity. Once again Defence Management has an
unknown potential liability. 
Structural problems –There is evidence of major cracks
along the expansion joints. This might be related to the
bad soil conditions where the building stands. DM has the
liability for this potential defect. 
Co-ordination problems – There were sequencing and
programming difficulties that, for example, led to the
scaffolding sub-contract in the final account amounting
to 87% over tender, which is approximately £500 000 in
excess of the original estimate. 
Labour shortages – The construction sub-contractor
experienced serious labour shortages. The Swindon
labour market was very buoyant with few people
available for employment as carpenters, electricians, etc. 
Latent defects – After delivery there was a three month
period of snagging to correct construction defects. A final
inspection was performed one year after delivery to
assess if all defects are corrected. There remains a period
of 12 years during which the construction sub-contractor
will be liable for latent defects. 
Poor design procedures – The review process was devised
by the construction sub-contractor but it proved to
jeopardise the progress of the construction works. It
introduced delays because construction could only start
when there were no comments from every partner. But
‘No comment’ did not necessarily mean, ‘I agree’, so
problems could surface later. 
Designs were not timely – Often the plans were revised,
with the annotation that there were only minor
alterations, which in reality would mean alterations in 50
items. The construction sub-contractor had the majority
of the drawings in his possession only near the end of the
construction period, while its delivery by the designer
should have been smoothly phased from the beginning of
construction. 
All the problems encountered meant that the GMP of 
£88 million actually cost the construction sub-contractor 
£120 million. 
Value for money 
In the JSCSC project the PSC was worth £68 million. The
project cost was estimated at £88 million but in reality
construction costs escalated to £120 million. The public
sector clearly got a good deal because now they own 
(or will own) a building at a fraction of its cost. 
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Key messages
Key learning points 
Is PFI a sustainable model? The main lesson to draw from
the JSCSC case study is to demonstrate how a PFI project
can be considered successful from the financial aspect
but at the same time be particularly ruinous for one
partner – the construction sub-contractor in this instance.
For PFI to be a sustainable solution it must demonstrate
fairness and a good deal for all stakeholders. Contracts
must have precise specifications as good quality
information is essential. A good contract must be
workable with good specifications. It must cover the
technical deliverables and provide for an on-going
continuous process that guarantees, over the long term,
good procedures during the contract management. In the
JSCSC PFI contract the construction requirements were
too lose. 
For the private sector 
• There must be consistency in the strategies and
objectives within the private sector team. It happened
that from the concessionaire point of view the project
was quite successful. But for the construction sub-
contractor there was a large loss of money and the
construction process itself was hectic 
• The project team must be appropriately staffed by all
stakeholders. The construction sub-contractor had
formed a young and relatively inexperienced team to
manage construction operations. This team was
consistently understaffed and was unable to counteract
the influence of the client’s team members in the
development and refinement of the design. It took the
construction sub-contractor several months to realise
that changes to the team composition were necessary,
by which time significant decisions had been made that
affected the completion of the project
• Good project management is essential. 
The co-ordination between the various construction 
sub-contractors was a serious problem in part due 
to delays in design 
• Don’t reassure the other partner too much. For instance,
in order to reassure the MoD that the building met their
wishes, the construction sub-contractor devised design
procedures (a review process) that proved to be a
hindrance leading to excessive delays and affecting the
already tight construction schedule 
• The project was rushed due to delays mainly in signing
the contract. The college needed to open on a specific
date otherwise an academic year would have been lost
• Do not sign any contract without having all planning
permissions in place. The construction sub-contractor
was informed just after the signing of the contract by
the planning authority of the requirement to lower the
building foundations by two metres 
• Do not sign a contract where there is too much room for
interpretation. The brief from the public sector was not
clear enough and the construction requirements were
too loosely designed. There was too much room for
interpretation as to what the building was supposed to
look like, consequently the key designer felt free to
interpret the client’s wishes 
• Lawyers can be useful. The approach of the team and
project manager of the construction sub-contractor was
too task-oriented and probably accepted some terms
and conditions wrongfully imposed
• Private companies cannot take an over-optimistic
approach taking risks for which they are not prepared 
• Value delivery network analysis. The co-ordination
problems experienced by the construction sub-
contractor originated in part by the huge number of
sub-contractors involved. Subsequently they undertook
a major revamping of the company culture to
incorporate their sub-contractors’ value chain
management systems into their own. Effectively, they
are simultaneously working within the company
developing their value chain analysis of the whole
supply chain and with their sub-contractors to make
them aware of the advantages and helping them to set
their own 
• Efficiency increases are always possible. To increase
efficiency the construction sub-contractor tried to
implement a nationwide agreement on procurement
with several preferential designated sub-contractors
• Unsuccessful projects hurt companies. In November
2000, John Laing plc announced the decision to sell
Laing Construction plc and its subsidiaries. Negotiations
took place between John Laing and O’Rourke plc and a
Heads of Agreement was signed on 2 April 2001. 
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For the public sector 
• A PFI project must be a good deal for all stakeholders.
The public sector negotiated a good deal, with the
project delivered on time, on budget and meeting the
service on a guaranteed benchmark. However, this came
at the expense of heavy losses for the construction
subcontractor. This situation could not become a regular
feature of PFI because if the private sector (where
construction companies are included) perceives that
they stand to lose money, then PFI will not be viewed as
a sustainable solution to public service investment and
delivery. There must be a perception of fairness
throughout the process
• A good PFI contract must be workable and with 
good specifications, encompassing both the technical
aspects and a good continuous review process. The 
main contract and the sub-contracts must form a
coherent hierarchy. 
Conclusions
A satisfactory project was completed and delivered to the
client. The concessionaire is continuing to provide the O
and M facilities and is receiving the annual schedule
payments. However, the construction sub-contractor
suffered major financial losses that contributed to the
demise of the organisation.
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Newport Southern Distributor Road (NSDR)
Location: Newport
Project cost: £200 million
Sector: Transport – roads
Status: : Construction completed in August 2004
Sponsors and concessionaire/lead manager: 
Morgan-Vinci Ltd (Morgan Sindall Investment Ltd and the
French construction group Vinci SA) have a 50/50
shareholding and equity stake)
Purchaser: Newport City Council
Contractual package: A DBFO contract between Newport
City Council and Morgan – Vinci Ltd. The scheme is let under
PFI with a concession period of 37 years. The project
sponsors executed capitalisation for the project privately.
Background – history and objectives
General
The Newport Southern Distributor Road (NSDR)
completed construction in August 2004. It is an
upgrading project, consisting of alteration of existing
roads to dual carriageway from Duffryn on the west of
the city to the Coldra roundabout on the east. It includes
a new bridge over the River Usk. The new dual
carriageway is located between junctions 24 and 28 of
the M4 and has been selected by the Department of
Trade and Industry as a flagship case study.
The NSDR has been recognised by Newport City Council
(NCC) as its highest priority scheme for the improvement
of Newport’s principal highway network. The NSDR
scheme is designed to ease the congestion on the M4 and
alleviate heavy traffic problems in and around Newport. It
is also designed to improve the environment in the city
centre, taking traffic away from residential areas,
improving access to industrial areas in the east and south
of the city and providing a new river crossing. The NSDR is
the biggest local authority PFI scheme in Wales. 
Scheme objectives
The scheme’s objectives include:
• Improved access to southern areas of Newport
• Improved economic development and regeneration
opportunities
• Significant contribution to the integrated transport
objectives of Newport
• Improved environment of the inner residential areas
• Improved road safety and reduction in the number and
severity of road accidents
• Enables traffic to avoid the town centre and inner
residential areas.
Scheme description
The design of the scheme was progressing for some time
under transport grant funding but the Welsh Office gave
it PFI Pathfinder status in April 1997. The PFI (DBFO)
scheme involves the design, construction, financing,
operation and maintenance of a high standard distributor
road around the periphery of Newport, including a major
new crossing of the River Usk. The operation and
maintenance concession is for 40 years.
The scheme generally follows the line of the existing
A4042 carriageway west of the River Usk with an offline
section north of the docks and similarly along the line of
the existing A455, east of the river to the Coldra
roundabout. A new crossing at the River Usk forms the
central part of the scheme, linking the two roads to
provide a direct and continuous carriageway and
distributor road around the south of Newport.
Other key details include:
• The length of the road is 9.3 km and is fully kerbed
tarmac
• 40 year construction, concession, operation and
maintenance period
• 10 year residual life at hand back period to NCC
• New upgraded highway bridges, subways, footbridges
and retaining walls
• New 200 metre long steel, bow string arch 
(River Usk Crossing).
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Bidding process – chronology of key events 
The key dates and events of the development of the NSDR are given in figure 3.3.
Pre 1997
Under Transport
Grant Funding
April 1997
Pathfinder Status
November 1999
Prequalification
(12 companies)
December 1999
First Interview
(8 companies remained)
January 2000
Second Interview
(4 companies remained)
June 2000
Tender Documents
prepared by NCC
July 2000
SPV (Morgan – Vinci)
established
October 2000
SPV submits offer to
Newport City Council
January 2001
Newport City Council
call SPV for discussions
March 2001
Newport City Council decide
BAFO
July 2001
Newport City Council declared
SPV as the preferred bidder
March 2002
Contract awarded to 
SPV (Morgan – Vinci Ltd) 
April 2002
Construction starts
March 2005
Completion of works (official)
Actual completion: August 2004
April 2042
End of concession period
0 1 2
98 12 15
17 21
29
28
Procurement period  (in months)
Construction period
Operation and
maintenance period
(37 years)
Figure 3.3: Key dates and events in NSDR
Construction phase
The project was completed in August 2004 – eight
months in advance of the scheduled completion date
March 2005.
Operational phase
Introduced eight months earlier than anticipated. 
The scheme is working to an agreed shadow toll payment
mechanism.
Risk transfer
The risk allocation and risk acceptance by the prospective
bidders was a major problem on this project. The risk
allocation matrix was an integral part of the bidding
documents which included 57 different risks, grouped under:
• Construction risks (17 items)
• Ground condition risks (five items)
• Pre-contract risks (four items)
• Third party risks (two items)
• Design risks (five items)
• Legislative, financial and economic change risks 
(seven items)
• Operation and maintenance risks (17 items).
Initial views on risk allocation in the bidding 
process were:
• Compliance with statutory/legal requirements and
planning process
• Pollution/contamination
• Compliance with existing contracts
• Benchmarking of insurance premium 
• Other major risks.
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Value for money
Public sector comparator 
During the procurement phase the PSC was developed.
This development took the form of more accurate costing
for both the procurement and operating aspects contained
in the preliminary PSC. The aim of this work was not to alter
the essential technical characteristics of the outline PSC used
in the business case for the NSDR project, but to reduce
the degree of uncertainty in the costing. The PSC calculated
by Newport City Council was approximately £49 million.
The capital expenditure (CAPEX - New Works Contract)
value is £55 million. Although there was an approximate
£6 million difference between the PSC and the CAPEX the
contract was signed between parties with the capital
expenditure value. The information given by a SPV
respondent explains why NCC chose PFI procurement:
‘To me the explanation is easy. NCC had no transport
grant funding to construct the road and PFI was the only
show in town. If NCC did not choose PFI no road would be
constructed in Newport. I am sure that if the NCC had
funding for the project they would not choose PFI’
(Interview with SPV respondent, 19 May 2004).’
Value for money
Although there is no information from NCC about the
VFM evaluation of this project, the decision to finance the
project through a PFI scheme was probably made because no
alternative options of financing were available.
This raises a fundamental question for such a PFI
contract: what is value for money? 
‘…value for money means two things: (a) long term quality,
and (b) cost effectiveness. And this project satisfies these two
important issues that the council requires’
Best value for road projects is referred to in the EU Directive
as ‘most economically and advantageous tender’ (British
Highways Agency, 1997) which also reflects the respondent’s
understanding of best value. Another respondent added: 
‘Principally the council will get at the end the objectives set
and the quality requested in the output specification. The
council will have (a) a good infrastructure quickly
constructed; (b) GMP for the overall life of the project is an
advantage for the client for his affordability calculation;
and (c) a durable quality output product. All of these issues
are value for money for the client’
Best value selection involves the evaluation of technical
and management factors in addition to cost, as opposed
to low-bid selection, which involves only cost comparison
of responsive bids from the bidders with PSC. Value for
money is not only the cost implication but an aggregation
of issues such as quality, price, technical merit, aesthetics
and functional characteristics, running costs, cost
effectiveness, technical assistance, delivery date, etc. 
Key messages
For the private sector
• In DBFO road projects the competitive proposal 
and negotiation process, for the benefit of the 
council, requires the contractors to be innovative 
and cost conscious
• The confidential discussions in the negotiation 
process in DBFO enables contractors to benefit from
innovations they propose without concern that their
ideas will be shared with competitors. Contractor-
initiated changes are integrated into the procurement
process as alternative proposals and occurring during
the procurement process before contract award
combines the issues of risk and reward within the
negotiations and develops more openness to the 
council and SPV objectives
• Benefits from long-term cash flow and the ability to
manage its supply -chain
• Improved integrated solutions and project development
methodologies
• Accumulated the cost efficiencies and whole-life cost
analysis in design and sustainable construction.
For the public sector
• The council experiences increased innovation and more
competitive pricing
• The whole DBFO procurement process results in best
value to the council
• Benefit of long term relations and managing its 
service delivery
• The possibility open to the council for best value
selection which has the potential to provide for the
selection of higher quality contractors and lowering
costs by rewarding technical innovations
• Creates less adversarial and claims-oriented projects
developing a higher level of honesty, openness and trust
with the private sector
• A whole-life approach to financing, designing,
constructing and operating and maintaining the NSDR
project
• Transfer the risks to the private sector that give value for
money to the public sector
• The DBFO is a performance contract which provides the
council with a performance specification that must be
met, by employing whatever means the private sector
determines to be most economical.
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Conclusions
The following key points were identified in this project:
• Early contractor involvement (construction sub-contractor
was able to work with the council and supply chain
throughout the bid process to identify the areas to add value)
• Partnering mechanism (the scheme was delivered using
informal partnering mechanisms and the co-located
council/designer/contractor team facilitated significant
improvements by allowing all parties to work together
early in the scheme’s development and design)
• The construction sub-contractor, through collaborative
working with the council, designer and supply chain,
optimised processes and managed risk in order to
deliver the NSDR scheme months ahead of the council’s
original programme
• Formal feedback mechanisms employed in the project
ensured that council requirements were met and that
partnering and team-working arrangements continued
to deliver best value
• Innovation was encouraged throughout the scheme
with both the designer and steel fabricator being given
incentives to generate innovative solutions
• Construction sub-contractor worked closely with the
council at all stages (tender, BAFO and financial close) to
manage costs within their budget. The construction
sub-contractor actively sought savings throughout the
duration of the scheme through creativity, innovation
and continuous improvement
• The co-location of the project team and several supply-
chain partners has facilitated regular interfaces and
efficient decision-making throughout.
The project team proactively drove the creativity, innovation
and continuous improvement throughout the procurement
and construction process. This meant the team:
• Beat the Newport City Council’s completion programme
by approximately eight months
• Achieved £6.35 million total savings and value adding in
the scheme through early construction sub-contractor
involvement
• Won the George Gibby Award for the Usk Crossing
Bridge (awarded by the Institution of Civil Engineers in
Wales)
• Won the Green Apple Award for sustainable
construction and was crowned National Champion for
Environmental Best Practice in the Building and
Construction sector.
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A92 upgrading between Dundee and Arbroath
Location: Angus, Scotland
Project cost: £150 million
Sector: Transport – roads
Status: Under construction
Sponsors and concessionaire/lead manager: 
Claymore Roads Ltd. (Morgan=Est, Barclays Bank)
Purchaser: Angus Council
Contractual package: A DBFO contract between Angus
Council and Claymore Roads Ltd. The scheme is let under 
PFI with a concession period of 30 years. The project
sponsors executed capitalisation for the project privately.
Background – history and objectives
General
The A92 between Dundee and Arbroath is a vitally
important strategic route for the east coast of Scotland,
serving the towns of Dundee, Monifieth, Carnoustie,
Arbroath and Montrose. It also serves as a major route 
for commercial traffic to these towns, and the ports of
Arbroath and Montrose. The existing single carriageway
road carries up to 18 000 vehicles per day. The traffic
volume increase and the accident record of the existing
A92 and associated roads is considered to be a major
factor in the continuing decline in economic activity in
the area. A consequence of these problems on the A92 is
that traffic is currently diverting to the less suitable
coastal corridor route – the A930. The affected local
authorities – Angus Council and Dundee City Council –
are aiming to improve the safety, quality of life and
economic opportunity in the area by upgrading the A92
and carrying out other improvements within the
A92/A930 route corridor.
Objectives
The councils identified the following key objectives for 
the route corridor:
• Reduction in accidents
• Journey time reliability
• Divert traffic from minor roads to the A92
• Improve economic regeneration
• Improve junctions 
• Improve public transport.
The scheme that is currently being promoted has been
tailored to meet these objectives. Full advantage has been
taken of innovative procurement routes to ensure that
the project will provide value for money and high 
quality of service to the taxpayer and the local
community. Further evidence of the councils’
commitment to innovation is highlighted by the fact
that they have successfully proposed the project as an
Egan (M4I) Demonstration Project. 
Scheme description
The bulk of the scheme will involve the upgrade of the
A92 to dual carriageway standard. A mostly on-line
solution has been chosen to maximise re-use of existing
road. The upgrade works include:
• Removal of traffic from Muirdrum and bypass the village
from south
• Removal of right turn movements by constructing
grade-separated junctions
• Construction of an A92/A930 link from Upper Victoria 
to Carnoustie
• Construction of a bypass around Barry village on 
the A930
• Realignment of the A930 between Muirdrum and Carnoustie
• Alignment improvements to various side roads.
Central government Transport Challenge Funding has
been secured by the councils to assist in the preparation
of the project. In 1998, technical (Babtie Group), legal
(Shepherd & Wedderburn), and financial (KPMG) advisers
were appointed to assist the councils in taking the
preferred route forward as a DBFO contract. This method
of procurement was seen as the only viable financing
option which would allow the councils to achieve their
objectives within the desired timetable. 
Scheme details
• Upgrading 18.7 km of the existing single carriageway to
a kerbed 7.3 m dual (2x2 lanes) carriageway with central
reserve safety fencing
• Upgrading and realignment of around 14 km of side roads
Construction operation involves:
• Excavation of approximately 900 000 m3 of material
(250 000 m3 of unsuitable material to be disposed of offsite)
• Laying approximately 350 000 tonnes of flexible
surfacing material
• 2.5 m wide verges at sides and 4.5 m wide with safety
fencing central reserve verge
• Four roundabouts, five grade-separated junctions and 
14 restricted access junctions
Case study 8
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• 22 reinforced concrete structures including bridges 
and culverts 
• A combined footway/cycleway along the full length of
the route, substantial accommodation works for local
landowners and approximately £3.5 million of statutory
undertakers diversions (water, gas, electricity and
telecommunications). 
Rural focus and public transport
The project is not viewed purely as a road improvement
project by the councils. The councils are ensuring that the
scheme fits within the government’s integrated transport
policy and maximises the opportunities created by the
upgrading to implement an integrated transport system
within the largely rural route corridor. The aim is to
provide alternative transport options to rural as well as
urban communities, reducing reliance on the car. 
The upgrading of the A92 and the other roads included in
the scheme will bring significant benefits to all modes of
transport. In terms of public transport, the improvements
will allow bus operators to provide a more consistently reliable
service along both the A92 and the A930. This improvement
in journey time reliability will be facilitated by the reduction
in accidents on both routes and the removal of congestion,
particularly at peak periods. It is predicted that this will
encourage more people to use buses rather than cars.
This project demonstrates how local councils can use
innovative procurement methods (DBFO) to achieve their
transportation objectives. 
December 1999
Planning permission
received
April 2001
Public enquiry - "No
concerted opposition"
February 2002
Angus Council issued
tender documents and
sent to four bidders
August 2002
Return of tenders
September 2002
Angus Council decided BAFO
October 2002
Angus Council declared
Claymore Roads Ltd as the
preferred bidder
October 2003
Contract awarded
Commencement of works
April 2006
Completion of 
construction works
October 2036
End of concession period
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50
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to construct a dual carriageway.
A92 not put on trunk road system
1996
The Angus Council established.
"Challenge Funding Document"
gave possibility for a PFI project
July 1998
Angus Council brought
external advisors to work 
with this project
20
Feasibility period and public enquiry (in months)
Procurement period (in months) Construction
Period
(30 months)
Conception period
(in months)
Operation and
maintenance period 
(30 years)
Bidding process – chronology of key events
The key dates and events for A92 are given in figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Key dates and events - A92
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Construction phase
The construction is undertaken by Claymore Roads Ltd. (a
special purpose vehicle established between Morgan
Sindall Investment Ltd. and Barclays Bank). The A92 PFI
(DBFO) contract is between Claymore Roads Ltd and
Angus Council (the granting authority).The new works
contractor is Morgan=EST, who have past experience in
road and infrastructure construction. The consultants in
the project are listed below.
Consultants to the council:
• Technical consultant: Babtie Group
• Legal consultant: Shepherd & Wedderburn
• Financial consultant: KPMG.
Consultants to the SPV:
• Design consultant: Faber Maunsell & Gillespies
• Legal consultant: Masons
• Financial consultant: Deloitte & Touche
• Traffic consultant: Steer, Davies & Gleave
• Checking consultant: Tony Gee & Partners.
Construction sub-contract
The new works sub-contract is between Morgan=Est and
SPV. The conditions of contract are based on the client
model, developed with the SPV, Claymore Roads Ltd. The
construction sub-contract will require the SPV to design,
construct, commission and complete the road for a fixed
GMP, lump-sum basis in accordance with the project
agreement (PA) and with the agreed programme. A
number of specialist sub-contractors are required to
enable Morgan=Est to fulfil its commitments. 
These include:
• Design
• Checking of design
• Site clearance
• Fencing and environmental barriers
• Safety fencing
• Drainage
• Earthworks
• Road pavements
• Road layout
• Kerbs, footways and paved areas
• Signs and road markings
• Lighting and electrical works
• Structures
• Environment and landscaping.
Design sub-contract
The new works sub-contractor Morgan=Est has engaged
consultants through sub-contracts as required by the PA.
The design sub-contract is signed with FaberMaunsell
(the designer). The designer undertakes the design of the
project, including the production of the design statement,
preliminary design, final design and the construction
drawings. Any specialist design sub-consultants utilised
by the designer will be employed directly by him. The
designer also fulfils the role and responsibilities as
defined in the Construction Design and Management
(CDM) Regulations, 1994. Details of this sub-contract are
not available. 
The designs prepared by FaberMaunsell & Gillespies have
been checked by an independent checking consultant
(Tony Gee & Partners). The checker was appointed
specifically to:
• Check and approve the new works drawings prior to
their issue for construction
• Issue corresponding design check certificate
• Maintain a register of design check certificates
• Prepare progress reports.
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Operational phase
The operation and maintenance contractor is Ringway
Highway Services.
Operation and maintenance sub-contract
The SPV (Claymore Roads Ltd.) entered into an O and M
sub-contract with Ringway Highway Services to operate
and maintain the roads in accordance with the standards,
specifications, procedures and other requirements as set
out in the PA. Performance points will be allocated on a
pass through basis from the SPV to Ringway in the event
of failure to operate and maintain to the required
standards.
The relevant project-specific work instructions for the 
O and M sub-contractor are:
• Routine maintenance
• Emergency call-out
• Winter maintenance
• Helpline
• Abnormal loads
• Vehicle safety fencing
• Safety inspection procedure
• Availability monitoring patrol.
Risk transfer
The risk allocation and risk acceptance by the prospective
bidders was a major obstacle on this project. The risk
allocation matrix was an integral part of the bidding
documents which included 57 different risks which were
grouped under:
• Construction risks (17 items)
• Ground condition risks (five items)
• Pre-contract risks (four items)
• Third party risks (two items)
• Design risks (five items)
• Legislative, financial and economic change risks 
(seven items)
• Operation and maintenance risks (17 items).
Initial views on risk allocation in the bidding process were:
• Compliance with statutory/legal requirements and
planning process
• Pollution/contamination
• Compliance with existing contracts
• Benchmarking of insurance premium 
• Other major risks.
The risk allocation matrix is shown overleaf.
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Risk description Risk ownership
Granting authority SPV Shared
Construction risks:
1. Environmental pollution ✓
2. Results of further environmental studies ✓
3. Archaeology finds during construction ✓
4. Protester action ✓
5. Delay to construction progress/completion ✓
6. Adverse weather ✓
7. Insufficient land (beyond land made available and access rights) ✓
8. Public utilities ✓
9. Contractor insolvency ✓
10. Construction inflation variance ✓
11. Construction noise ✓
12. Pest damage ✓
13. Traffic management ✓
14. Road safety audit ✓
15. Accommodation works ✓
16. Planning amendments/delay (compliant bid) ✓
17. Planning amendments/delay (variant bid) ✓
Ground condition risks:
18. Soft ground ✓
19. Hard ground ✓
20. Ground water ✓
21. Mine workings ✓
22. Rock quality and presence ✓
Pre-contract risks:
23. Change in interest rate ✓
24. Employee requirement changes ✓
25. Scheme cost increases ✓
26. Inflation risk ✓
Third party risks:
27. Relevant authorities ✓
28. Interested parties ✓
29. Change in quantities ✓
30. Changes from initial design ✓
31. Change in design standards ✓
32. Employers’ requirement changes ✓
33. Council and contractor solution changes ✓
Legislative, financial and economic change risks:
34. General change in law ✓
35. Interest rate risk (post financial close) ✓
36. VAT status risk ✓
37. Inflation risk ✓
38. Availability risk ✓
39. Traffic usage risk ✓
40. Performance risk ✓
Operation and maintenance risks: 
41. Unforeseen defects (including pavement failure) ✓
42. Accident damage ✓
43. Vandalism ✓
44. Weather ✓
45. Traffic loading ✓
46. Renewal and replacement of structures and infrastructures ✓
47. Utilities access ✓
48. Replacement of drain, signs, barriers, etc. ✓
49. Pavement patching ✓
50. Existing structures failure
51. Hand back inspections ✓
52. Road safety audits ✓
53. Staff costs ✓
54. Inadequate performance of sub-contractors ✓
55. Force majeure ✓
56. Termination for contractor default ✓
57. Other termination ✓
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Value for money
Public sector comparator 
The PSC was developed during the procurement phase.
This development needed to take the form of more
accurate costing for both the procurement and operating
aspects of the PSC. The aim of this work is not to alter the
essential technical characteristics of outline PSC used in
the business case for the A92 Project, but to reduce the
degree of uncertainty in the costing. The PSC calculated
by Angus Council was approximately £43 million. The
capital expenditure (CAPEX – new works contract) value is
£53.54 million. Although there was an approximate £10
million difference between PSC and CAPEX, the contract
was signed between parties with the capital expenditure
value. The information given by a council representative
responsible for site works explains why this ‘unexpected’
difference occurred.
‘At the beginning of the bidding process there were four
bidders, but shortly afterwards one of the bidders
withdrew from the bidding. The remaining three went
through the tender process. Probably, the low contract
value and the high bidding costs were the reason why few
companies were interested in participating in the bidding.
Since no other bidders were available the council had to
choose the lowest bid which was still much higher than
the PSC.’
Value for money
There is no information from Angus Council about the
value for money evaluation of this project. The decision to
finance the project through a PFI scheme was probably
made irrespective of this characteristic having no better
options of financing.
The project for the upgrading of the A92 started in 1984
with the project agreement signed with the preferred
bidder on 30 September 2003. The upgrading project
could not be achieved within the public sector
procurement regime due to a lack of government funding.
Angus Council had no other alternative to private finance.
In the words of an informant:
‘For this particular road project there was no other
alternative but PFI to build it. If the council did not accept
PFI the A92 project would not be realised. The only reason
why Angus Council chose PFI was because of lack of
funding from central government for this particular
project. Therefore, the council selected the only available
alternative.’
Best value for road projects is determined by the EU
Directive as being the ‘most economically and
advantageous tender’ (British Highways Agency, 1997). As
the respondent added, 
‘Principally the council will get at the end the objectives
set and the quality requested in the output specification.
Although there is £10 million difference between the PSC
and the preferred bidder’s price, I see the PFI deal as a
"political value for money" for the A92 upgrading project’.
Best value selection involves the evaluation of technical
and management factors in addition to cost, as opposed
to low-bid selection, which involves only cost comparison
of responsive bids from the bidders with PSC. Value for
money is not only the cost implication but an aggregation
of issues such as quality, price, technical merit, aesthetics
and functional characteristics, running costs, cost
effectiveness, technical assistance and delivery date.
According to Clause 43 of the PA, the SPV shall carry out a
review of operations in the concession period on each of
the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th and 25th anniversaries of the
Permit of Use Date (the ‘VFM Review Date’).
The VFM review shall consider and report on:
• Any material innovations in technology which have
come to the attention of the SPV and which could
enhance the operations
• Jointly with Angus Council, the O and M requirements in
order to assess whether any alteration in them would
represent increased VFM for both parties.
The VFM review report submitted by the SPV shall
include:
• The methodology of the review
• Any material innovations in technology or material
efficiencies in best working practices relevant to the
delivery of the operations which represent VFM
• Any proposed changes to the O and M requirements.
VFM review and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) clawback
provisions have been included on five yearly cycles after
the permit to use (PTU) date to:
• Secure continuous assessment of whether improved
VFM could be achieved by innovation
• To recover 50% of ‘super profits’ gained by the SPV
subject to there being no double-counting with
refinancing and also subject to reconciliation of any
super-profit recovery with under performance over the
life of the project. The threshold equity IRR figure above
which super-profits are shared was negotiated to 22.5%.
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Key messages
The key messages are the same as in the NSDR project
(case study 7).
Conclusions
The construction sub-contractor’s ‘early solutions
together’ philosophy has been a guideline during the
execution of the works to find the quickest, most effective
way to make the A92 an efficient route.
Affordability was a top priority for Angus Council and in
order to satisfy this issue Morgan=Est identified a number
of innovative ways to improve time and cost savings for
Angus Council. These innovations were grouped under
three headings:
• Sustainable solutions
• Time savings
• Re-engineering the road.
Sustainable solutions: The key requirement of the 
A92 construction was the large quantities of material
needed to form the road structure. Redundant land in 
the form of a disused airfield provided a ‘sustainable
solution’ for sourcing the necessary material which was
recycled and used to form an improvement layer for the
road. The unsuitable material from road excavation was 
used to fill the hole left in the airfield. The fill material
was then covered with topsoil creating a new field that
could be farmed.
Time savings: The early sourcing of suitable raw material
meant that Morgan=Est could work through the winter,
co-ordinating the scheme four weeks ahead of schedule.
Re-engineering the road: Morgan=Est has achieved
further cost efficiencies by re-engineering the local
authority roads around the scheme and therefore
removing the need for an underpass which resulted both
in money and time saving.
By working closely with the client and other 
stakeholders, Morgan=Est’s team has been able to add
value by developing solutions that have saved time and
money to the benefit of Angus Council, Morgan=Est and
the local economy.
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Despite growing interest in innovation in construction
some commonly held perceptions still exist:
The construction industry is not very innovative.
Construction is a ‘backward industry’ and, in particular, one
that fails to innovate in comparison to other sectors.
However, these perceptions do not do justice to the
importance of innovation in the PFI industry. For all
construction companies there are the eternal pressures
from clients to improve quality, reduce costs and speed up
construction processes. The benefits of PFI innovation in
construction include:
• The improvement of working conditions and improved
health and safety
• Lower construction costs
• Quicker construction times
• Improved risk management
• Better value for money for the clients. 
Furthermore, as a result of innovation in PFI construction,
certainty is now being put forward as a fourth
competitive dimension to be added to the existing
dimensions of cost, quality and time. But PFI innovation is
not solely about competition and organisational
performance; issues of customer choice, social and
environmental sustainability and quality of life are
equally important.
Latham, Egan and Fairclough have all suggested several
problems in the construction industry, including PFI,
which could be overcome through innovation and creative
problem solving. For example, the findings of the Egan
report called for:
• Increased turnover and profitability for construction
organisations
• Increased productivity at all levels
• An increased number of projects to be completed on
time and within budget
• A reduction in capital construction costs
• A reduction in the time from client approval to practical
completion
In response to the findings of the Latham and Egan
reviews, a host of UK government-supported initiatives
and programmes have been established to drive radical
improvements in construction, including the Construction
Research and Innovation Strategy Panel (CRISP), Partners
in Innovation (PII) and Movement for Innovation (M4i). 
A critical factor claimed for PFI is the ability to bring
improved innovation into the project delivery. This
improved innovation is intended to enhance project
success. Without innovation a business lacks competitive
advantage. Construction firms have to improve their
capabilities in managing innovation if they are to build
reputations for technical excellence that set them apart
from more traditional players. Moreover, successful
innovation enables construction firms to respond to the
aspirations and needs of society and clients, whilst
improving their competitiveness in dynamic and abrasive
markets. The PFI case study of Victoria Dock Primary
School gives an indication of how a construction
organisation can achieve competitive advantage by
changing the way it views its own business activities and
then responds to local social needs. 
Generic research into the effects of the working
environment on creative and innovative behaviour has
produced strong findings, which suggest that innovation
can be increased in organisations through the
management of variables that influence behaviour.
Specifically, variables in the form of social influences
(such as organisational culture and climate) and
contextual issues (such as task and time constraints) act
as either stimulants or obstacles to the creative behaviour
of individuals in organisations. 
The social and contextual factors that influence the
creative and innovative behaviour of individuals in
construction organisations within the limited and
constrained context of the PFI project have tended to be
ignored. No previous study investigating the influence of
work environment factors on the creativity of individuals
has been undertaken in this PFI context. It is hoped that
by highlighting the importance of identifying these
situational variables that improvements in the
management of PFI can be made. PFI remains a limited
market segment of the construction industry. However,
because of the nature of the PFI arrangement a PFI
‘project’ could involve any part of the construction
industry, and as such it is a useful microcosm of the 
entire sector.
The stimulants and obstacles to success within PFI projects
chapter four
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Stimulants and obstacles at all levels• A reduction in the number of defects on hand-over by
contractor to the client. 
At the external level, professional bodies and clients can
influence PFI innovation and have a role in supporting: 
• A culture where people are open-minded, willing to
accept change, flexible, and free from dogma
• Flexibility in the lines of communication and structures
that allow top-down, bottom-up and lateral
communication within the organisation
• A risk-tolerant climate where it is accepted that lessons
can be learned through mistakes
• A ‘knowledge-friendly culture’ where people are not
inhibited about sharing knowledge and do not fear that
sharing knowledge could cost them ‘power and
influence’ or even their jobs
• An ‘iterative-learning’ culture where the lessons 
learnt on one project are freely available for everyone 
to assimilate.
At the PFI project level, increased co-operation among
organisations involved in construction is required. This
will ensure innovation efforts within particular projects
are co-ordinated and result in the delivery of a successful
project. The HOT influence in projects is also a potential
variable for creative idea sharing and innovation. 
Companies should give employees some freedom in their
workload so that they have an opportunity to develop and
experiment with new ideas. Training and development
plays an important role in the successful development of
PFI innovation, whilst a lack of or insufficient coherent
information and a lack of or insufficient resources, such as
finance, can be barriers.
Table 4.1: PFI stimulants 
External environment level
• Clients
• Competition
• Government
• Professional bodies
• Sharing of ideas in the industry
• Supply chain
Organisation level
• Encouragement of creative problem solving
• Fair, constructive judgement of ideas
• Reward and recognition for creative work
• Mechanisms for developing new ideas
• Clear shared vision
• Encouragement of risk-taking and risk management
• Attraction of creative people
Project level
• Supervisory encouragement
• Clear and appropriate goals
• Motivation and commitment to the project work
• Diverse and suitable background of individuals
• Good communication
• Openness to new ideas
• Trust and help for others within the team
• Constructive criticism of ideas
Job role level
• Challenging and interesting tasks and projects
• Time control over work
• High autonomy
• Freedom
• Access to appropriate materials and facilities
• Access to necessary information
• Adequate funds
• Training and development
• Creativity training
• Creativity element of job description and appraisal
• Conducive physical environment
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Table 4.3: Detailed stimulants in PFI case studies
Identified stimulants Altcourse Tagus bridge JSCSC Victoria Dock
( * identified as significant) Prison Primary School
External level
Clients *
Competition
Government
Professional bodies
Sharing ideas in the industry
Supply chain
Organisational level
Encouragement of creative problem solving *
Fair, constructive judgement of ideas
Reward and recognition for creative work
Mechanisms for developing and implementing new ideas *
Clear shared vision *
Encouragement of risk taking & risk management
Attracting creative people
Project level
Supervisory role models *
Clear, appropriate goals * *
Support for work group and individual
contributions from supervisor
Motivation and commitment to the project work * *
Diverse and suitable background of individuals
Good communication *
Openness to new ideas
Trust and help for others within the team
Constructive criticism of ideas
Job role level
Challenging and interesting tasks and projects * * * *
Time control over work *
High autonomy *
Freedom
Access to appropriate materials and facilities *
Access to necessary information *
Adequate funds * * *
Training and development
Creativity training
Creativity in job description
Conducive physical environment
Totals +2 +5 +3 +12
Table 4.2: PFI obstacles
External environment level
• Client procurement route
• Coalition nature of construction 
• Lack of communication
• Legislation
Organisation level 
• Internal political problems 
• Destructive internal competition
• Harsh criticism of new ideas
• Conservatism and avoidance of risk
• Rigid structures and strict processes 
• Lack of mechanisms for developing new ideas
• Lack of rewards and recognition
Project level
• Format of project contract
• Rigid project demands
• Segmentation of project disciplines
• Poor collaboration
• Poor communication 
• Lack of openness and trust
• Poor project management
Job role level
• Extreme time pressures
• Unrealistic expectations for productivity
• Distractions from creativity
• Financial constraints
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It is possible to identify the stimulants and obstacles 
that have occurred in some of the preceding case studies.
Relevant features are only identified if they create a
‘significant’ difference to the more ‘traditional’ approach
to construction. So a feature has been identified only if
the two following conditions are met:
• The feature has materially affected the risk neutrality 
of the project
• The feature has materially affected the substantive
completion on time, quality and price.
The four case studies have been evaluated by a simple
numeric count of the positive (*) stimulants and the
negative (x) impediments/obstacles that have been
identified by the evaluation of the case study details. No
work has yet been executed to quantify the proportional
contribution of each feature. It treats all features in an
identical manner. Table 4.5 presents the numeric count
and figure 4.1 presents the evaluation. The most effective
projects occur when the stimulant (solid line) is as far
from the axis as possible, and the impediment line
(dotted line) is as close to the central axis as possible. 
Table 4.5: Summary of collated stimulants and 
obstacles by project
Altcourse Tagus JSCSC Victoria
Prison Bridge Dock 
Primary
School
Stimulants +2 +5 +3 +12
Obstacles -14 -9 -15 -2
Total -12 -4 -12 +10
Table 4.4: Detailed obstacles in PFI case studies
Identified obstacles Altcourse Tagus bridge JSCSC Victoria Dock
( x identified as significant) Prison Primary School
External level
Client procurement route x x
Coalition nature of the industry x x x
Lack of communication x x
Legislation x
Organisational level
Internal political problems x
Destructive internal competition x
Harsh criticism of new ideas x
Conservatism and avoidance of risk x
Rigid structures x
Strict processes and procedures x x x
Lack of mechanisms for developing and implementing new ideas x x
Lack of rewards and recognition
Project level
Format of project contract x x x
Rigid project demands x x x
Segmentation of project disciplines x x x x
Poor project management x
Lack of communication and collaboration
Lack of openness and trust x x
Job role level
Extreme time pressures x x
Unrealistic expectations for productivity x x x
Distractions from creativity
Financial constraints x x x x
Total -14 -9 -15 -2
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Where the obstacles exceed the stimulants (as in the
prison, bridge and JSCSC case studies) there is an
indication that the level of success in the project has 
been impaired. 
Table 4.6 presents the numeric evaluation of stimulants
and obstacles by hierarchical level. The most effective
projects would again occur when the stimulant (solid line)
is as far from the axis as possible, and the obstacle line
(dotted line) is as close to the central axis as possible.
However, in these case studies there is an indication that
the inter-relationship between the levels is also important.
The findings suggest the obstacles are more significant in
the descending order of external, organisational, project
and role, whilst the stimulants appear to be more
important at the organisation and project levels than at
the external or job role levels. No work has yet been
executed to quantify the proportional contribution of each
level. It treats all levels in an identical manner.
Table 4.6: Summary of collated stimulants and
impediments by hierarchical level
External Organisational Project Job role 
level level level level
Stimulants +2 +3 +6 +11
Obstacles -8 -10 -13 -9
Total -6 -7 -7 +2
Prisons CS 1
Bridge CS 2
Military CS 3
School CS 4
Stimulants
Obstacles
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
KEY
Figure 4.1: Comparison of stimulants and 
obstacles – by case study
0
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Figure 4.2: Hierarchical aggregated stimulants
and impediments 
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The improvements sought by the Egan Agenda have 
been examined within the PFI cases studies, concluding
as follows:
• Increased turnover and profitability for construction
organisations. The SPV in each of the case studies has
improved turnover and profitability. However, the
construction sub-contractors have suffered in terms of
profitability because of the limitations contained within
the provision of a GMP 
• Increased productivity at all levels. It is difficult to directly
ascertain productivity improvements from within the
cases studies. However, by using completion dates as a
substitute measure then most projects have been
delivered prior to the target delivery date indicating that
overall productivity exceeded initial expectations
• An increased number of projects to be completed on time
and within budget. Delivery to the project sponsor
within time and budget has been improved beyond that
typically experienced by traditional construction
procurement. Delivery within budget for the SPV has
been achieved because of the GMP mechanism
contained in the construction sub-contracts. Delivery
within budget by the construction sub-contractor has
failed to be achieved in two case studies
• A reduction in capital construction costs. Because of the
structure of the financial model within PFI it is difficult
to directly ascertain capital construction cost reductions.
However, the promotion of value engineering and risk
management techniques has been identified as
contributing to cost savings in whole life cycle costs for
each of the four case studies
• A reduction in the time from client approval to practical
completion. This has failed to be achieved within any of
the case studies. The complexity of the negotiations
involved in achieving financial closure on a PFI project
has resulted in an increase in time between clients’
initial approval and commencement on site. This has
been offset by significantly reduced site construction
times. The utilisation of ‘fast-track’ construction is
inextricably linked to PFI construction
• A reduction in the number of defects on hand-over
by contractor to the client. This appears to have been
achieved on all four case studies. The importance of
being ‘defect-free’ has lost its significance for the 
client as the very nature of PFI requires the SPV to be
responsible for operational quality for a long time span.
Furthermore, the payment mechanisms provide for 
a deduction to be made if the services fail to meet
quality standards. 
What can also be identified is that in three of the case
studies the numeric count of the obstacles significantly
outnumbers the stimulants and the aggregate obstacles
count exceeds the stimulants at all but the job role level. In
three cases the construction contractor suffered significant
cost over-runs. However, the concessionaire with a GMP
obtained virtually complete protection against these cost
over-runs. The client was equally protected by the
concession arrangement.
In the cases of the prison and military projects the
stimulant and obstacle count is very similar (+2, -14, +3, -
15), however an evaluation of the ‘success count’ of each
project (a crude measure of the perceived successful
delivery of the projects) would yield a significantly different
response. For instance, the prison project would be deemed
overall to be more successful, by all parties, than the
military project. This would suggest an imbalance between
the proportional contributions of individual features to the
deemed success or otherwise of a project.
A further detail is that the higher level stimulants, 
i.e. those at the external and organisational level, are
noticeable largely by their absence, whilst the obstacles to
innovation occur at all levels in the hierarchy. One
interpretation of this feature is that the senior
management associated with PFI projects have not
evolved sufficiently to recognise the difference between 
a major ‘traditional’ project and a major PFI project. It
appears therefore, that senior management have not
changed their patterns of behaviour despite the change in
procurement process. 
Conclusions
The empirical study of the four case studies suggests that
to date the ‘claimed’ innovation associated with PFI is
largely unrealised. There appears to be significant
‘untapped’ scope for improving the innovation within PFI
projects and hence improving project success.
The model of obstacles within PFI should be examined by
all parties. They should verify that all obstacles have been
examined and that they are satisfied with their removal as
far as is practicable for a particular project. 
The stimulant model should be used in a similar manner
and parties should verify that the stimulants have been
incorporated as far as is practicable.
Given this verification, it is expected that a subsequent
review of similar cases would yield an analysis that was
predominantly positive, rather than the currently achieved
balance that is predominantly negative. Further evaluation
of completed PFI projects utilising the model will give an
indication of whether the levels of innovation are
improving as further experience of PFI is accumulated.
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• A ‘knowledge-friendly culture’ where people are not
inhibited about sharing knowledge and do not fear that
sharing knowledge could cost them ‘power and influence’
or even their jobs. The JSCSC had a novel approach to
knowledge sharing and design approvals. It was
extremely effective, but may have contributed to the
creation of further obstacles that hampered the project
delivery. It was criticised for being inflexible and very
slow 
• An ‘iterative-learning’ culture where the lessons learnt on
one project are freely available for everyone to assimilate.
There is little evidence that iterative learning is freely
available. Unfortunately most of the project experiences
are implicit to the individual and there was no
structured mechanism for converting implicit
knowledge held by individuals into explicit knowledge
available to everyone. This also links to a previous point
relating to risk tolerance. Individuals are culturally
biased from publicising personal mistakes. Mistakes
that could be avoided on future projects are not
adequately reported. A further point to note is that the
risk registers and risk reports are considered to be
extremely commercially sensitive. It appears that
organisations consider the risk register as a source of
competitive advantage for future PFI schemes. 
PFI is developing world-wide as a procurement
mechanism. The elimination of unintentional constraints
upon innovation within the PFI project and the inclusion
of stimulants can improve project quality, reduce costs
and improve delivery times by minimising the risks
associated with this form of procurement.
The detailed analysis of these case studies has resulted in
the development of a series of recommendations that are
presented in the concluding section of this report.
A further case study (the A92 road project) has also been
quantitatively analysed. This indicates that the elimination
of obstacles and the support of the stimulants at early
conception stage has yielded a 12-15% reduction in capital
cost of construction (with no impairment of whole-life
cycle operational costs) and an 8-10% reduction in
construction time scales, leading to earlier delivery of the
project and an increased period during which service
charges can be claimed (which, in financial gain to the SPV,
is approximately equivalent to a further 6-8% increase in
expected revenues from the project).
At the external level, interventions suggested by
professional bodies and clients have influenced the PFI
case studies as follows:
• A culture where people are open-minded, willing to
accept change, flexible, and free from dogma. The case
studies have failed to demonstrate this. HMPS rejected
an innovative design solution and insisted on reverting
to a tried and tested prison layout. The Tagus Bridge had
a client body that changed during the project inception
and sought to introduce changes to the project
agreement. This resulted in a ‘traditional’ adversarial
style of management that led to the need for the global
financial settlement to restore parity to the financial
model for the scheme. The JSCSC project had a very
effective client team. It was so effective that it
overpowered the construction sub-contractor which
resulted in disastrous consequences for the construction
sub-contractor team. The Victoria Dock Primary School
project demonstrates a successful achievement of this
intervention strategy
• Flexibility in the lines of communication and structures
that allow top-down, bottom-up and lateral
communication within the organisation. The case studies
identified no improvement over the level expected
within traditional forms of procurement. 
The JSCSC case study indicated that the flexible lines of
communication hampered the delivery of the project.
Too much informal communication bypassed the formal
structures and resulted in some project failures.
However, the Victoria Dock Primary School appeared 
to have worked effectively with the informal
communication structures that existed
• A risk-tolerant climate where it is accepted that lessons
can be learned through mistakes. There is no indication
in three of the case studies that a risk tolerant climate
existed. There is some evidence from the Tagus Bridge
that creative problem solving was being encouraged and
this was demonstrated in some of the technical changes
that were incorporated in the final project solution
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A typical PFI structure is shown in figure 5.1. The only
noticeable difference from the previous well known forms
is the increasing complexity of the arrangement of
participants, combining as it does elements of traditional,
design and build, and management forms of
procurement. The PFI form of procurement therefore
requires the provision of typical QS services. The
additional advantage of the PFI format is threefold:
• Typical QS services are now required by more separate
parties
• Further higher value added services are now required
• QS services are now needed for a longer duration.
These QS services are required by the public sponsor, the
SPV, the design and construction companies, the
operation and maintenance companies, and by the
various financial institutions providing equity, commercial
loans and debt finance.
The overall end purpose of any procurement strategy 
is to select an arrangement that is fit for purpose and
satisfies the client’s needs by meeting the main
procurement parameters, ie time, cost, quality and
certainty. Clients procure construction services from
constructors and traditionally such forms of procurement
have been realised through different procurement paths:
• Profession–led design procurement path (traditional)
• Constructor–led procurement path (design and build)
• Management forms of procurement
• PFI / PPP forms of procurement.
Within each of the first three forms of procurement
the quantity surveyor (QS) has evolved over time and
emerged to provide developments of the traditional and
historical QS function that meets changing demands.
PFI is merely an additional form of procurement. It is 
now therefore the responsibility of the QS to provide
services that respond to the needs of this evolving form 
of procurement.
The emergent role of the quantity surveyor in PFI
chapter five
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Figure 5.1: Basic structure for a PFI/DBFO project
in the UK
Source: Akbiyikli & Eaton, 2004
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The key elements of PFI QS services
Figure 5.2 represents the potential for value added
services that are now required in the execution of a 
PFI project. It is not intended to define the service but
to identify the potential areas within which QS Services
can be developed and to highlight the crucial role of 
the QS in ensuring value for money and delivery of the
project on time. 
The design cost  
must address 
environmental issues
Innovation in the design
must be validated
Creative solutions must  
be tested for feasibility 
Risk management is  
a critical element of 
successful PFI
Performance measurement
and payment mechanisms
Project management
skills of a high calibre  
are vital
Certification of work 
for primary lenders as
the project proceeds
Design cost advice to
consider construction,
operation and 
maintenance
Advice on PSC
and VFM
The project costs  
must incorporate lifecycle
costing advice
Major project experience
Feasibility and  
viable expertise
Facility management and
operational cost advice
Audit and due diligence
PFI and  
the quantity
surveyor
Figure 5.2: Value added QS services
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Fig.5.3: Timescale showing where QS services are required
The conception stage
• Where an idea has been initiated.
The feasibility stage
• This stage will appraise the option, assessing realistic
alternatives for achieving the business need. Establishing
whether the project is viable to proceed.
Business plan
• A business case needs to be prepared to establish whether
the project is affordable under PFI.
Testing value for money
• At this stage the bid is put out to competitive tender
through the OJEC. The PFI scheme is compared with the 
PSC to establish whether this route is value for money.
Award of contract
• After the pre-qualification of bids, short listing and
negotiations, the contract is awarded to the preferred
concessionaire and a contract award notice is cited 
within the OJEC. 
Construction
• The construction phase is completed by the private sector
consortium, which has accommodated the majority of the
risk associated with the project.
Operation and maintenance
• After the construction phase the consortium is 
responsible for maintaining the scheme to a specified
standard and over a stipulated period of time 
(25-30 years).
Selling on/transfer
• After the contract has terminated, the project will be
returned back to government in a suitable standard
specified within the contract. The government is in a
position to gain the economic benefits from the 
remainder of the economic life.
Office of Government Commerce Private Finance Unit, 1999
Figure 5.3 represents the extended timescale over which
QS services are now required.
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Illustrating the main opportunities for QS
services in PFI
Figure 5.4 illustrates the QS service opportunities and
the types of provision that may be provided for the
different parties.
Public sponsor
Concessionaire
Planning and understanding
of what needs to be done
Time is needed to plan the 
project properly
Concession periods need  
to be neither too long nor 
too short
Risk management is 
essential to the successful 
completion of the project
Advising upon the complexity 
of the documentation and the 
contract conditions
Lack of time prevents the
ability to look at alternative
methods of achieving these 
solutions
The earlier the team is  
brought together the better 
the understanding of what 
is  required will be achievedTime
management
Cost
management
Risk  
management
and risk  
transfer
Documentation
preparation
and control
Financiers
Contractors
Success depends on the
quality of people employed
The ability to understand
problems that the parties may 
experience when taking the 
project through public scrutiny
Providing continuity to the
background and history of 
the project
It should cost no more for
operatives to carry out a good
job as opposed to a poor job
People
management
Providing VfM and WLCC
advice to the parties
Satisfactory financial 
management is essential.
Money constraints are
inevitable
Value for money
and WLCC
management
Knowledge
management
Client parties Service issues Service provisions
Fig.5.4: QS opportunities for different parties within the
PFI project
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In Figure 5.5 each of the traditional time, cost, quality
parameters of other forms of procurement are merged
with the certainty parameter. Historically the time, cost,
quality triangle was considered to be a trade-off, ie higher
cost and higher quality necessitates more time. PFI has
taken the control of the original parameters to a higher
level. Within PFI, achieving a high level of certainty in the
control of time, cost and quality is now an essential pre-
requisite to achieving financiers support for the
borrowing requirements. 
‘Bankability’, ie satisfying the prospective primary lenders,
requires that cost, time and quality now have a greater
degree of up-front guarantee of delivery before the
lenders will agree to the borrowing regime for the project.
Achieving high levels of ‘bankability’ can improve the loan
terms and quantum of the borrowing. These loan terms
will inevitably alter the financial viability of the project
but could cause the project to fail its initial financial
viability test. In such cases alternative funding may be
required to supplement the financiers lending. This could
mean increasing the initial concessionaire cash
investment in a project. This is typically of the order of
10%. In the Tagus Bridge project a €320 million EU
Cohesion Fund and a €160 million government grant was
required before the project could achieve sufficient
‘bankability’ to become economically viable. In the
Victoria Dock Primary School project, the concessionaire
increased his initial cash investment to 25% of the project
cost and the public sponsor contributed a non-
reimbursable grant of £0.2 million to raise the level of
‘bankability’. 
In both cases the provision of QS-type services was
required to assess the level of ‘bankability’ achieved in the
projects. Individual QSs and cost consultants were
appointed for the public sponsor, the concessionaire and
the primary financiers before the project achieved
financial closure, ie the point when all parties agree that
the project is capable of delivery.
Figures 5.6 to 5.9 provide a more detailed examination 
of each of the four co-dependent parameters. For
example, in figure 5.6 the sub-parameters of time for
design and time for construction indicate time issues 
that have assisted in achieving the time certainty within
PFI. The A55 road project achieved delivery before the
programmed completion date. This was achieved by
ensuring that during the development of the production
programme the construction schedule provided adequate
time for the design to be developed and for the
incorporation of client change orders without disrupting
the construction schedule.
On the A92 road project the capital construction cost of
the project was reduced by attention to the cost
dependency sub-parameter of tax implications, as
indicated in figure 5.7. The constructor avoided significant
payments of aggregate tax and land fill tax by
incorporating recycled sub-base road improvement fill
obtained by demolishing an abandoned runway adjacent
to the site. This recycled material was used on the road
and surplus excavated material was used to reinstate the
void created by the demolition.
On the NSDR road project the whole life cycle cost of the
project was based upon the expectation that the
attention to quality performance characteristics of the
road surface, as illustrated by figure 5.8, would mean that
no unexpected road closures would be necessary during
the first ten years of operational life. 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the sub-dependency variable
associated with achieving improved certainty within the
PFI projects. Careful attention to risk and risk transfer has
been addressed within all of the previous case studies.
Complexity and change have also been identified within
the case studies. On the JSCSC project the change order
and approval scheme has been identified as being a major
problem. An alternative approval scheme could have
prevented some of the cost uncertainty associated with
that project. 
These figures (5.6-5.9) act as prompts or checklists of
issues to be addressed in developing the project plan for
an individual project. They are not exhaustive, but they do
serve to provide prompts that can be used to identify
issues to be addressed within the project development
cycle. They can also be used to assist in identifying risk
items that should be considered in implementing a
project proposal. 
Fig.5.5: The co-dependent functional procurement
parameters of PFI
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ProcurementTime Certainty
Quality
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Fig.5.6: Time dependency parameters
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Fig.5.8: Quality dependency parameters
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Figure 5.10 represents an analysis of the proportionality
of risks identified on a typical PFI project. Assuming that
a score of 250 represents a comprehensive risk evaluation
of a social, legal, economic, environmental, political,
technological (SLEEPT) risk category then it can be seen
that a complete risk management matrix would follow
the circumference of the hexagon. Each risk category
would have a score of 250 points. 
Typically, there are imperfections in the risk analysis such
as 20 points of economic risk are unregistered. However, a
typical political risk category can have as many as 210
points of unregistered risk. Other risk categories follow a
similar pattern.
Summary
The QS is well placed to develop and provide refined 
risk management tools and services to move the typical
risk profile towards the optimum. The QS can develop and
provide services to all parties associated with PFI projects.
This will involve providing risk management, whole life
cycle cost advice, value for money feasibility and viability
advice as well as due diligence advice and the more
traditional cost advice services for which the QS
profession is well renowned. PFI projects offer the
opportunity; it is now the responsibility of the QS to
provide these services.
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Fig.5.10: Typical risk management matrix for PFI
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forms of procurement. There is no fundamental economic
reason to reject the PFI approach, but it must be
economically justified.
The three road project case studies (the A55, A92 and
Newport Southern Distributor Road) and the Victoria
Dock Primary School are examples of an extreme form 
of economic justification. It has been acknowledged by
members of these projects’ sponsors that the PFI
approach was the only game in town. Furthermore, they
concluded that:
• There was no alternative approach that had any
foreseeable chance of being executed
• All of these local authorities had competing demands
for the available finance
• Despite the economic and social necessity of such
projects, there were always going to be other projects
with even greater needs.
The Tagus River Crossing in Lisbon, Portugal had the same
economic and social needs as well as a central
government with little realistic chance of securing full
finance for such a major project. The JSCSC and HMPs
Altcourse and Parc are subtly different. In these cases
there was an alternative financing mechanism available
for the Ministry of Defence and HMPS. In these cases an
economic evaluation was conducted and concluded that
PFI would provide a more efficient utilisation of the
available financial resources.
These projects demonstrate a form of purchase that is
common to some British households. PFI is a form of hire-
purchase, paying by instalments until such time as the
capital value plus financial charges has been recouped by
the provider. It is accepted that the quantum involved is
large but in annual percentage terms it is no larger than
an individual accepts when hire purchasing a new car. 
The critical success factors (CSFs) that have emerged from
the case studies are not new. Figure 6.1 demonstrates
that the old time/cost/quality triangle has now changed
to a rhomboid and become time/cost/quality/certainty.
PFI and PPP have a ‘political’ genesis. Whenever
governments have needed investment and felt
unable to finance such investment through taxation 
they have sought private investment to supplement
public expenditure (for instance, the development of 
the entire canal system in the UK is a good example of
early PFI). The reinvention in the late 1980s and the
consequent politicisation of an age-old procurement
approach has meant that much published material about
the effectiveness and efficiency of PFI is driven by a
political doctrine.
This report has attempted to remove the political dogma
and present a balanced and reasoned argument of the
benefits and costs of the PFI approach. Removing political
dogma does not, however, mean avoidance of political
issues. The context of the re-introduction of PFI after the
lapse of nearly 200 years relates to the major structural
and political changes. The accession of the UK to the EU
and the agreement to the Maastricht Treaty criteria
created an unprecedented economic and political
pressure to reduce drastically public sector spending in
the UK. At the same time, other European legislation and
changing social mores led to equally unprecedented
social, environmental and legal pressure to improve the
infrastructure and social provisions within the UK. 
SLEEPT pressures created competing and occasionally
mutually exclusive objectives for the public and private
sectors. This has been highlighted by much of the media
coverage of PFI initiatives. However, the political and
technological imperatives overcame these resistances and
a period of dramatic change emerged. Government (both
central and local) was no longer the exclusive provider of
public services as it became a purchaser of contracts for
service. The private sector has also changed from
providing built assets to being utilised by the public
sector. This has involved the private sector being paid for
the construction of the assets and becoming providers of
services, paid for the quality and quantity of service
provided.
With political encouragement, the UK private sector is
now investing in the improvement and upgrading of
‘traditional’ public sector services. In 2005 it is anticipated
that PFI expenditure will approach 40% of the fixed
capital investment of the UK. This will be matched by a
further 40% of capital expenditure by government
(both central and local) utilising more traditional 
Conclusions
chapter six
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• Public sponsor 
• Concessionaire (SPV)
• Lenders
• Constructors 
• Operators.
There are also four generic features of PFI that can be
identified within each PFI project:
• The risk transfer approach 
• The robustness of the project arrangements 
• The value for money achieved within the project
• The overall affordability of the project scheme.
This creates potentially competing objectives that need to
be managed to deliver a successful project.
The risk transfer approach refers to the balance achieved
within the agreements between all of the parties in
relation to accepting the financial consequences should a
risk occur on a particular PFI project. As an illustration,
Best Practice Guidance confirms that a risk should be
allocated to the party best able to manage and control
the risk. In the prison case studies a complete round of
tendering was rendered invalid because the public
sponsor had attempted to transfer the occupancy risks to
the concessionaire, when it was patently obvious that the
public sponsor, HMPS, was the only party that could
manage the risk associated with the number of prisoners
sent to a PFI prison. In the JSCSC project the risk
associated with cost escalation following design
development was transferred from the public sponsor,
who was in control of the design development, via the
SPV to the contractor who was responsible for
constructing the buildings. This risk was so severe that it
significantly contributed to the demise of the
construction company. In hindsight this risk should not
have been accepted with the level of design completion
that had been achieved at the time of the provision of 
the GMP.
The iterative and co-dependent nature of the time/ cost/
quality functions now have an additional co-dependent
function of certainty. Sponsors now want certainty in: 
• Time of delivery 
• Projected cost of construction
• Projected cost of operation
• Projected cost of maintenance
• Quality of the product
• Quality of the process
• Projected useful lifetime of the complete project
• Projected useful life of the components associated with
the particular PFI project.
Previously the contractor was concerned with providing
adequate quality within time and cost requirements only
until at most one year after practical completion. This
continued until the expiration of the defects liability
period. Then the contractor was effectively ‘off the hook’
and the quality of the provision and its associated cost
became the absolute responsibility of the client. Now,
however, the SPV and its facilities management provider
are concerned about quality and cost throughout a 20 to
30 year time period and in certain cases are required to
give a cast-iron ‘fit-for-use’ guarantee for a further ten
years upon reversion to the project sponsor after the
expiration of the concession period. Thus the time scale of
the significance of these co-dependencies has increased
by a significant factor of between 10 and 20 times.
What is now required is the development and securing of
QS services to ensure that all of these requirements are
being fully met and, if they are being fully met, that they
are met on each and every project for the entire life-cycle.
A further issue that has emerged from the evaluation of
the case studies is the emergence of differentiated risk
profiles, differentiated by the class of party to the project
and also by the prioritisation of the features for the
specific PFI project. Five generic groups of parties that
have the potential to utilise QS services within a PFI
project have been identified:
Cost
ProcurementTime Certainty
Quality
Time Quality
Cost
Figure 6.1: Time, cost, quality and certainty
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There is also evidence from within the case studies that
PFI projects are providing better quality provision than
other more typical forms of procurement. This is also
endorsed by further NAO analysis. The increasing
emphasis on WLCC to support decision making on issues
of quality appears at this early stage in most PFIs to be
successfully implemented by the providers. There will be
no definitive evidence until after the expiration of the
concession period and then it will only be verifiable if the
SPV releases the operational cost data. 
The overall affordability of the project relates to the
ability of all parties to complete the project with the
available resources. The public sponsor has to ensure that
it has access to funds and that the expenditure of the
available funds provides an adequate return when
compared with other alternative investments. The private
parties need to ensure that they have access to sufficient
finance and other resources to complete the project and
obtain an income from the operation of the facility over
the concession period. All of the case studies contained in
this report have been completed and become operational.
This is not necessarily guaranteed. The combination and
balance between risk transfer, robustness, VFM and
affordability therefore needs to be considered holistically.
Figure 6.2 takes a sample register from a PFI project and,
through simple discriminant analysis, identifies and
allocates the risk to those parties significantly affected by
the occurrence of a particular risk. The asterisk indicates
that the identified risk will have a significant impact on
the risk neutral position of the relevant party. It should be
noted that risks can impact on more than a single party -
some risks can impact on all parties.
The robustness of the project arrangements refers to the
concurrence of the individual aims of the individual
parties with the main project objectives. The project
arrangements should be equitable for all parties, ensuring
that all parties have the ability to complete a particular
project without the necessity for ‘step-in’ and so that no
party perceives the agreement as unfair. A satisfactory
robustness arrangement would be one that all parties
would be prepared to execute for subsequent projects.
HMPS identified this as a major risk when it publicly
stated that it had foregone significant initial savings on
the first two projects in order to create a long term
competitive market in PFI prison provision. 
A further question relating to the robustness of PFI
project arrangements is the level of up-front risk capital
necessary to develop a PFI project. It is accepted that the
‘at risk’ capital needed for a PFI development has
increased from that required for other more traditional
forms of procurement. However, this is reflected in the
level of profitability sought within the PFI repayment
model to demonstrate the bankability of the project. 
The Victoria Dock Primary School project demonstrated
that this increase in ‘at risk‘ capital can pay dividends. It
has, however, been recognised that the costs of preparing
unsuccessful bids could be an impediment to free 
market entry. 
The project case studies have identified that an important
stimulant to successful development of PFI is the previous
expertise within a market sector that the prospective
bidder can draw upon when developing the proposal.
The VFM criteria relates primarily to the public sponsor
who frequently has a statutory duty to demonstrate that
their expenditure is being managed effectively and
efficiently. This is typically done by reference to the PSC. It
should be noted that in the Victoria Dock Primary School
project, the cost exceeded the PSC. Independent
consultants declared that this was a bad PFI project.
Other intangible benefits that are not currently permitted
to be included within the PSC meant that, in the view of
the project participants and perhaps more importantly
the local residents, they all believe that the project has
been really successful. It should also be remembered that
the private parties within a PFI project all have a
requirement to conduct profitable business and so will
have their own VFM evaluation requirements. PFI projects
are supposed to generate ‘win-win’ opportunities rather
than the more orthodox ‘win-lose’ situations. The JSCSC
demonstrates a project where this did not occur. There is
evidence from within the case studies and from
subsequent NAO evaluations that most PFI projects in the
construction and property sectors are providing value for
money. The PFI prison case studies show a trend of
improving VFM for the public sector.
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Figure 6.2: Discriminant analysis for parties of a simple risk register
Risk category Public sponsor SPV Lenders Contractors
Social:
Protester action * *
Public utilities *
Traffic management *
Road safety audit *
Interested parties * * *
Vandalism * *
Legal: 
Environmental studies requirements * *
Planning amendments – compliance * *
Planning amendments – variance * *
Relevant authorities * * * *
Design standard changes * *
General legal changes * * * *
Economic:
Delays to progress/completion * * *
Adverse weather *
Contractor insolvency * * *
Inflation variance * * *
Scheme cost increases * *
Inflation risk * *
Quantity variance * *
Design variance * * *
Employers requirement changes *
Contractor solution changes * *
Interest rate risk (post close) * *
Vat status risk * *
Availability risk * *
Usage risk * * *
Performance risk * *
Abnormal staff costs * *
Inadequate s/c performance * *
Force majeure * * * *
Determination – contractor default * *
Determination – sponsor default * * *
Determination – other * * * *
Environmental:
Environmental pollution * *
Archaeology * * *
Noise * *
Pest damage * *
Political:
Interest rate change * * *
Employers changes *
Change of government * * * *
Change of PFI policy * * *
Technological:
Limited site area *
Works accommodation *
Soft ground *
Hard ground *
Ground water *
Mine workings *
Rock quality and presence *
Unforeseen defects * *
Accident damage *
Wear and tear *
Renewal and replacement – planned *
Renewal and replacement – unplanned *
Utilities access * *
Repair and maintenance *
Construction failure * *
Snagging * *
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Figure 6.3 utilises the same discriminant analysis for the
risk transfer, robustness, VFM and affordability criteria. It
should be noted that some risks may only affect one
aspect, whilst others may affect all four of the criteria.
Figure 6.3: Discriminant analysis for key risk differentiated criteria
Risk category Value for money Robustness Affordability Risk Transfer
Social:
Protester action * * * *
Public utilities * *
Traffic management * *
Road safety  audit * *
Interested parties * * * *
Vandalism * * * *
Legal: 
Environmental studies requirements * * *
Planning amendments – compliance * * *
Planning amendments – variance * *
Relevant authorities * * *
Design standard changes * * * *
General legal changes * * * *
Economic:
Delays to progress/completion * *
Adverse weather * *
Contractor insolvency *
Inflation variance * * *
Scheme cost increases * * *
Inflation risk * * * *
Quantity variance * * *
Design variance * *
Employers requirement changes * * * *
Contractor solution changes * * *
Interest rate risk (post close) * * * *
Vat status risk * * *
Availability risk * * * *
Usage risk * * * *
Performance risk * * * *
Abnormal staff costs * *
Inadequate s/c performance * * *
Force majeure * * * *
Determination – contractor default * * * *
Determination – sponsor default * * *
Determination – other * * * *
Environmental:
Environmental pollution * * *
Archaeology * * *
Noise * * *
Pest damage * * *
Political:
Interest rate change * * * *
Employers changes * * * *
Change of government * * * *
Change of PFI policy * *
Technological:
Limited site area * *
Works accommodation * *
Soft ground * *
Hard ground * *
Ground water * *
Mine workings * * *
Rock quality and presence * *
Unforeseen defects * * * *
Accident damage * * *
Wear and tear * * *
Renewal and replacement-planned * * *
Renewal and replacement-unplanned * * *
Utilities access * *
Repair and maintenance * * *
Construction failure * * * *
Snagging * * * *
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In such a short paper it is impossible to scrutinise all
aspects of the PFI approach. However, the conclusion to
be drawn is that PFI is an effective procurement route
that has grown considerably in use in recent years and
will become increasingly important to an even wider
group of services within the public sector in the near
future. Indeed it is expected that PFI will continue to grow
overall as a proportion of all construction activity. 
It is now the responsibility of the entire construction and
property professions to ensure that PFI is applied
appropriately. Only when it is applied in this manner will
PFI provide value for money for the contracting partners.
To this end, the role of the QS will be pivotal to ensuring
that PFI delivers the potential benefits without permitting
the potential abuses that could occur. The following
chapter outlines how to ensure this happens and that PFI
reaches its full potential for all parties involved.
We have seen within the case studies, examples of
inappropriate risk transfer. In two cases the risk transfer
was rejected by the bidders (prisons) whilst in another
(JSCSC) the risk was accepted without adequate
contingency or risk premium. We have also seen that the
SPV is now involved from a much earlier phase in the
project development cycle and this has been
accompanied by an increase in the time scales of the pre-
construction phases. 
There is no suggestion within the case studies that
this increase in timescales is not important to the
successful implementation of the project, however there
are signs that some of the increase is associated with a
lack of familiarity with the PFI philosophy and its
associated procedures. This increase in timescale has 
led to an increase in the cost of bid preparation for
projects. Within the case studies certain private sector
parties have criticised the project sponsor for overly
bureaucratic procedures. However, sponsors have shown
significant improvements as projects progress and repeat
sponsors have shown significant improvements from
their novice position. It is believed that this is a function
of the newness of the process and this can cease to be a
major issue. 
There is some evidence from within the case studies that
the increase in pre-commencement on site time is offset
by reduced construction durations. The significance here
is that all the time saved during construction reaps a
financial dividend for the SPV in having a longer
operational period during the concession. For instance,
one of the road projects finished earlier than anticipated
and contributed an additional £0.25 million in revenues
from shadow toll payments.
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Recommendations
chapter seven
Risk management – education and training: a critical
feature of successful PFI projects is effective and efficient
risk management. There should be development of
and/or support for the provision of courses that would
increase the dissemination of risk management and
improve the quality of risk management provision
available to the construction and property industry. A
basic provision of risk management tools and techniques
should appear in appropriate undergraduate degree
programmes and advanced education and training in
postgraduate programmes.
Risk transfer guidance – effective allocation and
evaluation for each party: a basic tenet of PFI is the
transfer of identified risks to the party best able to
manage the risk should it occur. However, there is
evidence that such principled risk transfer is not currently
the accepted norm. Guidance should be provided to all
stakeholders on ‘what’ ‘why’ and ‘how’ equitable risk
transfer should be achieved within PFI projects. 
Risk management tools – effective dissemination of
available tools: risk management tools should be
developed and disseminated in order to improve the
quality of risk management within the property and
construction industries.
Whole life cycle costing – education and training:
a critical feature of successful PFI projects is the effective
and efficient use of WLCC techniques. There should be
development of and/or support for the provision of
courses that would increase the dissemination of WLCC
and improve the quality of WLCC management provision
available to the construction and property industry. A
basic provision should appear in appropriate
undergraduate degree programmes and advanced
education and training in postgraduate programmes.
Recognition and inclusion of value for money criteria
relating to risk transfer: especially social, environmental,
political and regulatory issues. The current structure of
the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is highly restricted in
the economic features that can be permitted to be
incorporated. Governments should permit the evaluation
and inclusion of benefits and ‘benefits in kind’ created by
the risk transfer approach adopted within particular 
PFI proposals. 
For government
Attain global leadership in PFI development activity: 
the UK should position itself as the natural leader in the
development of international and national PFI practice.
This should also include the UK seeking representation on
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe –
Build, Operate, Transfer (BOT) Expert Group.
Recognised international PFI practitioner qualification:
there is scope within the UK to demonstrate international
leadership in determining the direction of PFI practice
development by developing an internationally recognised
PFI practitioner qualification. 
Create and manage a standard form of PFI cost report:
with the growth of PFI procurement, the UK Government
should provide the strategic direction in the provision of
detailed PFI project cost reporting provision. While the
Building Cost Information Service (BCIS) cost report
provides useful information on the basic construction
costs, the PFI practitioner now needs cost information
combining capital cost, cost in use, facilities
management, operational costs, etc. that exceed those
currently provided. This PFI cost report would be
invaluable for all stakeholders in determining the value
for money, risk transfer policy and premiums, affordability
and robustness criteria and premiums of current and
future PFI projects. The PFI cost report would also provide
information on the payment mechanism incorporated
into the financial model. It could also provide an
indication of the creativity and innovation achieved by the
project and/or incorporated in innovation premiums
within the project. The report could also provide a ‘key
messages’ section providing feedback on major issues
arising within the project, including the identification of
novel risks incurred within the project and a commentary
on how they were dealt with and their impact.
Create and manage a standard form of whole life cycle
costing (WLCC) reports: associated with the need for a PFI
cost report is the necessity of WLCC feedback. This should
become an extended form of the Building Maintenance
Cost Information Service (BMCIS), to provide detailed
feedback on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facilities management costs
associated with the long term operational features of PFI
concession periods. A ‘key messages’ section as previously
described would benefit all PFI stakeholders.
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Recognition and inclusion of the cost benefit analysis
‘additionality’ afforded by PFI: for example, the benefit
of local involvement through employment on the project.
An ‘additionality’ premium should be permitted for
exceptional benefits accruing to a particular project.
Payments for a proportion of unsuccessful or abortive
tendering costs for short-listed bidders on OGC,
Partnership UK or other government-approved projects:
the risk capital involved in preparing a PFI proposal is
demonstrably higher than other forms of procurement. It
also takes far longer to complete a PFI bid than other
forms of bids. These both have an effect on restricting the
competition to only those companies that are able to
afford the initial investment. There is some anecdotal
evidence that unsuccessful bidders have made a strategic
retrenchment, and will not contemplate future PFI bids.
This issue will impact in the long term on the VFM,
robustness and affordability issues raised previously. The
inclusion of a payment for a proportion of the costs of
unsuccessful bids would encourage new market entrants
and previously unsuccessful bidders to continue to bid for
subsequent projects.
Government encouragement and ‘seed-corn’ fund for
SME PFI projects: the ability of an SME to contemplate
involvement in developing a PFI project is severely
restricted by the proposal costs. The financial support for
a proportion of the bid costs and the availability of SME
support funding could significantly enhance the ability of
an SME to promote ‘smaller’ PFI projects. This will also
involve the creation of shortened PFI documentation for
smaller scale PFI projects.
Government support/approval for the development of
alternative concession mechanisms as alternative to fixed
duration concessions: a time limited concession appears
to be the standard approach to developing a concession
arrangement. Alternative limits, such as traffic volumes,
number of fee paying entrants, etc should be examined
and encouraged when appropriate. The alternative
concession mechanisms could also assist in resolving
‘unbankable’ risk transfer issues.
Recognition of the risk management benefits and the
inclusion of a risk premium: the private sector has an
entrepreneurial reason for accepting PFI projects. A part
of this entrepreneurial relationship is the acceptance of
risks that have historically always been carried out by the
public sector. If the private sector evaluates this risk and
proposes a risk ‘premium’ to cover the accepted risks, then
this risk premium should be permitted as an addition to
the PSC, to allow equitable evaluation of alternative
procurement approaches.
Recognition of ‘robustness’ issues of PFI procurement:
the PFI approach is most effective when an honest, open
and trustworthy (HOT) approach to project partnering is
accepted. This approach requires the attainment of
congruent aims and objectives – in such cases a
‘robustness’ premium may be required to align the aims
and objectives and should be a permitted addition to the
PSC for equitable evaluation.
Recognition of ‘affordability’ issues of PFI procurement:
the long term sustainability of the PFI niche market for
transport, defence, education and environmental projects
will require niche specific expertise. In the short term, the
acceptance of bids that create PFI competition, when not
necessarily the lowest effective bid, should be permitted
if it can be demonstrated that such a bid will enhance
and develop the niche expertise. This will prevent the
creation of niche-specific near monopoly suppliers.
Permit changes to the Public Sector Comparator
calculation recognising creativity and innovation issues:
the PSC should permit the incorporation of a creativity
and innovation premium developed through the project
to encourage the entire PFI project team to implement
alternative project solutions. Most of the project case
studies have had creativity inhibited by the reluctance of
the project sponsor to incorporate ‘new ideas’ into the
project. Such a premium would recognise the imperative
of developing new approaches for the benefit of the
whole of the UK economy. 
Permit changes in the Public Sector Comparator in
recognition and inclusion of the taxation and
environmental emissions implications of WLCC:
the incorporation of WLCC can have an impact on the
initial cost of the project, which is subsequently reflected
in operational savings. These operational savings can
often be significant. This future benefit should be
permitted as an allowance in the PSC for equitable
evaluation with alternative forms of procurement. 
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Guaranteed maximum price education and training: a
novel development within PFI has been the willingness of
constructors, operating as sub-contractors to the SPV, to
provide a GMP for the capital construction costs of the
project. The consequences of offering and accepting a
GMP must be recognised by the project sponsor. The risks,
although directly incurred by the SPV, tend to have a
‘knock-on’ effect for the sponsor. These ‘knock-on’ risks
associated with an inappropriate GMP are similar to
accepting a traditional tender which is determined to be
unrealistically low. The certainty of time, cost and quality
are all hampered. The JSCSC project incorporated a GMP
that proved to be impossible to achieve. In this instance
the project was delivered to time and quality but the cost
implications led to the subsequent demise of the
construction sub-contractor. However, if the demise had
occurred during construction the outcome could have
been very different.
The consequences of requesting and then accepting a
GMP must be recognised by the SPV. The risks are directly
incurred by the SPV. These risks associated with an
inappropriate GMP are similar to accepting a traditional
tender which is determined to be unrealistically low. The
certainty of time, cost and quality are all hampered. This
is particularly pertinent when the construction sub-
contractor tends to be an operational division of the same
company conglomerate as a partner in the SPV.
Risk and value for money training: it is essential that
both the SPV and the project sponsor have adequate
expertise in risk management and VFM. Decisions relating
to these issues have an extraordinary impact on the
whole PFI project. An unequal access to the relevant
expertise could also hamper the project. As indicated in
the Vasco de Gama Bridge project, the unequal expertise
created a major handicap for the project sponsor. The
JSCSC project had unequal expertise favouring the project
sponsor and this led to the SPV accepting ‘unreasonable’
risks, which it transferred directly to the construction sub-
contractor. Ultimately this could have had disastrous
consequences for the project.
Issue guidance on degree of disclosure: governments
should issue advice and guidance on the extent of
disclosure required of project sponsors to achieve legal
genuineness of agreement between the sponsors and the
SPV. Non-disclosure or only partial disclosure could create
the grounds for a legal challenge based upon
misrepresentation if the SPV finds itself in financial
difficulties caused by a lack of information from the
sponsor. The Vasco de Gama bridge project (case study 3)
was put in this position by a failure to disclose changes to
contractual agreements with government contractors
that became subsumed within the bridge project
agreement. In this case the Portuguese Government
conceded its failings and a substantial cash settlement
was agreed as a part of the global re-settlement of the
financial model for the operational phase of the project.
This issue has not yet been tested in the UK courts. Such
guidance could help to avoid this issue in the future.
For the private sector
Adequate and appropriate PFI/PPP expertise availability:
prospective project sponsors should ensure that they only
embark upon the PFI process if they have ensured
adequate and appropriate expertise is available. This may
mean the appointment of external advisors. However,
without the correct expertise available, the creation of an
effective and efficient project proposal will be
significantly hampered. Expertise is required to ascertain
value for money for the project sponsor at all stages of
the project, from conception through to selling
on/transfer. Expertise is required in time management,
cost management, risk management, documentation and
contract management, people management, knowledge
management and WLCC management. There were
indications within the Vasco de Gama Bridge project that
the lack of adequate expertise on the part of the project
sponsor and its government advisors led to ineffective
project preparation and the consequent additional global
settlements to the agreed financial model. 
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NAO National Audit Office
NEDC National Economic Development Council
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development
OGC Office of Government Commerce
OJEC Official Journal of the European
Community
PA Project agreement
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PFU Private Finance Unit (of OGC)
PPP Public Private Partnerships
4Ps PPPP – Public Private Partnerships
Programme
PRG Project Review Group
PSBR Public sector borrowing requirement
PSC Public sector comparator
PTU Permit to use
QS Quantity surveyor
RICS Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors
SLEEPT Social, legal, economic, environmental,
political, technological
SME Small and medium-sized enterprise
SoPC Standardisation of PFI Contracts
SPV Special purpose vehicle
VFM Value for money
WLCC Whole life cycle cost
BAFO Best and final offer
BBO Buy build operate
BCIS Building Cost Information Service
BMCIS Building Maintenance Cost Information
Service
BOO Build own operate
BOOT Build own operate transfer
BOT Build operate transfer
CPO Compulsory purchase order
CSF Critical success factors
DBFO Design build finance operate
EFL External financing limit
GMP Guaranteed maximum price
GSA General settlement agreement
HMPS Her Majesty’s Prison Service
HOT Honest, open, trustworthy
HRA Human Rights Act (1998)
ITN Intention to negotiate
IRR Internal rate of return
JSCSC Joint Services Command and Staff College
JV Joint venture
LDO Lease develop operate
LU London Underground
MoD Ministry of Defence 
MERA Multiple estimating risk analysis
Glossary
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